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RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-Usury-National Bank
Reserving Interest in Advance on Installment
Loans Yielding an Effective Rate of Return in
Excess of Statutory Limit Violates Section 85 of
National Bank Act if Same Loan Made by State
Lender Would Be Usurious
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, a national bank operating in Arkansas pursuant to the
National Bank Act,' sought a money judgment for principal and
interest due it as payee on two notes executed by defendant, a
natural person. The notes evidenced two installment loans on which
the bank had charged eight percent interest in advance,2 by dis-
counting one note and by adding interest to the face of the other
note.3 Refusing to honor the notes, defendant contended that the
advance interest charges, which raised the effective yields on both
notes' above the Arkansas ten percent annual limit,5 were usurious
1. 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1970).
2. One note evidenced an installment loan of $11,000 payable in twelve equal monthly
installments, from which the bank had discounted eight percent annual interest. The other
note evidenced a $2,000 loan payable in thirty-six equal monthly installments to which the
bank had added eight percent interest in advance. Defendant executed both notes on January
11, 1974 and renounced them as usurious on January 15, 1974 without having made any
payments.
3. "Discounting" and "adding-on" are distinguishable in that the face amount of a
"discounted" note represents the amount on which the interest is based, although the bor-
rower actually receives the face amount less that interest (net principal), whereas the face
amount of an "added-on" note represents the amount on which the interest is based plus the
interest, although the borrower actually receives only the amount on which the interest was
based (face amount less interest, or net principal). The effects of "discounting" and "adding-
on" are similar (the effective yield of "adding-on" being only slightly less than the effective
yield of "discounting"). For purposes of this comment, the term "discounting" will encom-
pass "adding-on."
4. The effective yield of the twelve month loan was 16.05% per annum; the effective
yield of the thirty-six month loan was 15.75% per annum.
5. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-602 (1957) provides in part:
Maximum rate of interest by contract.-The parties to any contract, whether the same
be under seal or not, may agree in writing for the payment of interest not exceeding ten
per centum. . . per annum on money due or to become due.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-603 provides:
Usurious interest prohibited.-No person or corporation shall, directly or indirectly, take
or receive in money, goods, things in action, or any other valuable thing, any greater sum
or value for the loan or forbearance of money or goods, things in action, or any other
valuable thing, than is in section [68-602] of this act prescribed.
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because section 85 of the National Bank Act permits national banks
to charge only as much interest as the most favored lenders operat-
ing under state law,6 and Arkansas would treat these installment
loans as usurious if made by its most favored state lender.' Plaintiff
asserted that only the state statute setting the ten percent maxi-
mum rate, and not the state case law construing the rate's proper
calculation to encompass effective yield, applies to national banks.
The District Court, upholding defendant's contention, held that
both notes were usurious and thus void with respect to interest but
not principal.8 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed.
Where a national bank reserves interest in advance on installment
loans, calculated at a numerical rate not in excess of the statutory
usury limits but yielding an effective rate of return in excess of the
state limit, and if a similar loan made by a state lender would be
usurious, the interest charged is beyond the "rate allowed by the
laws of the State" in violation of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 85. First National Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975).
I. BACKGROUND
Although most states permit the deduction of interest in ad-
vance at the highest legal rate,9 many states restrict the practice to
6. 12 U.S.C. §85 (1970) derived from section 30 of the National Bank Act of 1864 ch.
106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108, and from Revised Statutes § 5197 (1875) without material change,
states in pertinent part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made
. . . or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State...
where the bank is located. . . and no more, except that where by the laws of any State
a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall
be allowed. . . . (emphasis added)
The section also provides an alternative rate of one percent in excess of the discount rate (or
5% in excess of the discount rate in the case of business or agricultural loans of at least
$25,000) on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank, if higher than
the state rate. The alternative rate was not pertinent to the issues in the instant case. Note
that the alternative rate applicable to business or agricultural loans does not go into effect
until 1977, unless the state enacts an interest law with similar provisions. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a
(P.L. 93-501, § 206 (October 29, 1974)5.
7. The Arkansas Supreme Court has construed the state's constitutional limit of ten
percent interest per annum as prohibiting an effective or actual yield beyond ten percent
annually based on the amount of money the borrower actually receives and the length of time
he has actual use of it. Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 499
S.W.2d 68 (1973), construing ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13 and ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-602, -603,
-608 (1957).
In the instant case the plaintiff-bank conceded that an Arkansas court would hold the
loans to defendant usurious if made by a state lender.
8. The District Court denied defendant's counterclaim for forfeiture of principal and
return of interest paid under Arkansas law, ARK. CoNST. art. 19, § 13, and applied the federal
penalty requiring only forfeiture of interest under 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1970).
9. 6 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 33, at 282-88 (1952).
RECENT CASES
short term loans, while a few jurisdictions, including Arkansas, pro-
hibit the practice on all loans' ° because it increases the effective rate
beyond the fixed legal rate. Whether a state law restricting loan
discounts applies to national banks located within state borders
depends on the construction of Section 85 of the National Bank Act,
which permits national banks to charge "interest at the rate allowed
by the laws of the State. . . and no more."" Crucial to the determi-
nation of cases decided under this provision has been each court's
position on the policy question of whether the Act should place the
national bank on parity with state banks or provide it preferential
treatment. The borrower has succeeded in proving usury only in
cases in which the court has adopted the parity posture. Interpret-
ing section 85 nine years after its 1864 enactment, the Supreme
Court in Tiffany v. National Bank'2 failed to consider the then still
recent legislative history and read the Act as designed to protect
national banks against state discrimination and intended ulti-
mately to replace state banks by national banks.'3 The Court estab-
lished the preferred lender doctrine to give national banks a compet-
itive advantage over state banks, holding that a national bank may
charge the highest interest rate allowed to the state's most favored
lender and is not restricted to the often lower rate governing the
state banks." In Union National Bank v. Louisville, New Albany &
Chicago Railway Co., '5 however, the Court interpreted section 85 in
a manner unfavorable to the national bank by accepting the Illinois
Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's preferred lender rate
and refusing to substitute a construction more favorable to the na-
tional bank. The Court held that, by incorporating the state rate in
the Act, Congress made the interest rate a matter of federal law, but
did not authorize the federal courts to interpret the rate adversely
10. For a thorough discussion of the differences among the states regarding discounting
short term notes, long term notes and installment notes, see Taking or Charging Interest in
Advance as Usury, 57 A.L.R.2d 630, §§ 10a, 10b (1958).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970).
12. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
13. Id. at 413; accord, C. Kreps, Modernizing Banking Regulation, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 648, 649-50 (contending that the prohibitive tax imposed on notes issued by state banks
was intended to eliminate the profitability of state banking, but that the unforseen rise of
deposit banking saved the state banks). Contra, Note, 58 IowA L. Rav. 1250 (1973) (criticizing
Tiffany and contending that a proper reading shows an intent to establish equality between
state and national banks).
14. The Court reached its conclusion by construing the word "different" in section 85
(see note 6, supra) to mean "higher" and not to mean "higher or lower" so that when a state
sets a "different" rate for state banks, that different rate applies to national banks only if it
is higher than the rate allowed other lenders; if the different state bank rate is lower, the
national bank may follow the higher rate allowed other lenders.
15. 163 U.S. 325 (1896) (interpreting Rev. Stat. § 5197, the predecessor of § 85).
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to the state courts.'6 Following the Union National Bank rule of
accedence to the state court construction, the Court in Citizens
National Bank v. Donnell" held that a national bank that com-
pounds interest in a manner prohibited by state law" violates the
Act even though the total interest amounts to less than the maxi-
mum rate permitted by the state. Nevertheless, when the Court
interpreted the provision as applied to state discounting rules in
Evans v. National Bank, 9 it avoided an analogy to Citizens Na-
tional Bank by relying on dicta in a pre-Act case 20 and on common
banking practices, ignoring a Georgia statute prohibiting discounts
from exceeding an eight percent effective rate. The Court found that
a single payment short-term note discounted at the state's maxi-
mum eight percent rate, but yielding in excess of eight percent, was
not usurious even though the same loan if made by a state lender
would be usurious. Moreover, it held that the rate "allowed by the
State" means the statutory numerical rate without regard to the
state's prescribed method of construing or calculating the rate.
Three Justices dissented2' on the basis of Citizens National Bank,
Union National Bank22 and a discerned Congressional intent to
place national banks upon a precise equality with state banks.2
Recently the Sixth Circuit in Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union
National Bank and Trust Co.2' extended Evans to apply to a long-
term installment note, to which interest had been added in advance
16. . . . [Tihe true construction of state legislation is a matter of state jurisprud-
ence, and while the right of the national bank springs from the Act of Congress, yet it is
only a right to have an equal administration of the rule established by the state law. It
does not involve a reservation to the national courts of the authority to determine
adversely to the state courts what is the rule as to interest prescribed by the state law,
but only to see that such rule is equally enforced in favor of national banks. (emphasis
added)
Id. at 331.
17. 195 U.S. 369 (1904) (interpreting Rev. Stat. § 5197).
18. The Supreme Court subjected the national bank to a Missouri statute prohibiting
the compounding of interest more often than once per year.
19. 251 U.S. 108 (1919).
20. Fleckner v. Bank of the U.S., 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 353 (1823). Fleckner is a
federal charter case, in which the Court held that discounting was permitted by the bank's
charter, adding in dicta that discounting was widely practiced.
21. The dissent contended that "the laws of the State" means "all applicable provisions
of the statutes as interpreted and construed by the decisions of the [state] court of last
resort. . . . The section has regard to substance, not merely to form." 251 U.S. at 116, 118.
22. See Comment, 29 YALE L.J. 457 (1920) (criticizing the majority for its position
inconsistent with prior decisions).
23. 251 U.S. 108, 117-18 (1920). Although the Justices read Congressional intent as
desiring national bank parity with state banks, they accepted the Tiffany doctrine establish-
ing the parity between national banks and state preferred lenders.
24. 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972).
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at the maximum rate. The applicable state statute prohibited dis-
counting at the maximum rate unless the lender submitted to cer-
tain restrictions with which the national bank did not comply. 2 The
Court held that the national bank was not bound by the state re-
strictions on discounting because its right to discount arose inde-
pendently of state laws that govern state lenders.2 To date, Evans
represents the only exception to the Court's interpretation that sec-
tion 85 incorporates the state interest laws as construed and applied
by the state court of last resort. Lower courts continue to defer to
state restrictions on interest rates in situations other than those
involving discounting,2s and abide by Evans in cases concerning
discounting of single payment short-term notes, but must select
between the Evans and Union National Bank rationales when con-
fronted with an installment note discounted in a manner prohibited
by the state. Northway's acceptance of Evans as controlling install-
ment note discounts represents the choice that accords a national
bank a competitive advantage not only over state banks, but also
over the most favored state lender.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court regarded Evans as inapplicable to discounted
installment loans, a type of obligation probably never contemplated
by the Evans Court in 1919 and distinguishable from discounted
single payment short-term loans by their higher effective yield. In-
stallment credit, the court explained, was practically nonexistent at
the time of Evans29 and has become widespread only with the recent
25. The note evidenced the total of the amount loaned, $250,000, and the interest for
five years at seven percent, $87,000, to constitute a face amount of $337,500, to be paid in
forty equal installments. The effect of the advance adding-on of interest and the installment
payments raised the actual or effective rate of interest to 131/2% per annum.
26. The restrictions were prescribed maximums on the amount of principal and charg-
ing costs.
27. 364 F.2d 855, 860-61 (6th Cir. 1972).
28. See, e.g., Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 65 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972) (Tiffany doctrine cannot be used to permit
national bank to evade state laws limiting the amount of principal loaned at certain interest
rates).
29. Today's installment note was uncommon at the time of Evans and nonexistent at
the time of Fleckner v. Bank of the U.S., the case on which the Evans court based its decision
to permit discounting of short term notes. The instant case renounced Fleckner's discussion
about banking practices as irrelevant to a consideration of commercial needs today, 150 years
after Fleckner. 509 F.2d 872, 878.
The amount of outstanding installment debt was still negligible in 1945, twenty-six years
after Evans, when it constituted merely 2.5 billion dollars. The total reached 29 billion in
1955, and has recently peaked at 100 billion. D. Caplovitz, Breakdowns in the Consumer
Credit Marketplace, 26 Bus. LAWYER 795 (1971).
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advent of consumer credit. In addition, the court observed that
while the discounting of single payment short-term notes, ratified
by the Supreme Court in Evans, will increase the effective yield only
nominally, the discounting of long-term and installment notes may
increase the effective yield by a factor of two or more." In view of
the increased economic impact on the consumer and the discrimina-
tion against state lenders not permitted to discount, the court ex-
pressed doubt that the Supreme Court today would extend Evans
to apply to installment or long-term notes. Having dismissed Evans
as inapplicable, the instant court then denied the validity of
Northway for its failure to distinguish between the economic effects
of discounting single payment short-term notes and installment
paper. Having found no authoritative case law on installment note
discounting, the court construed section 85 in light of legislative
history3 and discerned a Congressional intent to give national banks
full parity of interest regulation with state banks or with any lender
given preference by the state. The preferred lender policy, the court
declared, was not intended to be extended to give national banks
superiority over all state lenders. In further support of its position
on the Act's underlying policy, the court cited Union National Bank
and Citizens National Bank, as well as two recent Supreme Court
cases that express a policy of parity, or "competitive equality,
3 2
between national banks and preferred state lenders. The court indi-
cated that the only construction of section 85 consistent with this
policy requires incorporation of the state's interpretation of its own
interest rate and the manner of calculating that rate. The court
therefore concluded that when a state interprets its statutory rate
to mean effective rate, so as to disallow installment paper discount-
30. The court gives the following example in a footnote. While a $1,000 single payment
one-year note discounted at eight percent yields an effective rate of 8.7%, the same note yields
16.05% if principal and interest are repaid in twelve monthly installments. 509 F.2d 872, 878
n.13. For other examples of effective yields on discounted installment paper, see the tables
in B. WoFFoRD, ANNUAL YmLDS ON INVESTMENTS (Nevada Research Report No. 4, 1965).
31. Citing the Senate debate, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2123-27, 2145 (1864),
and a study of the provision's intended meaning, Comment, 58 IowA L. REv. 1250 (1973). See
Note, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 416, 425 (1935).
32. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133, 136-37 (1969); First Nat'l Bank v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966).
Compare the Dickinson Court's statement about "penetrating the form of the contracts
to the underlying substance of the transaction," 396 U.S. at 137, to the Evans dissent's
criticism of the majority's failure to look beyond the form of the loan, 251 U.S. 108, 118
(quoted supra, note 21). Also, note the Dickinson Court's statement that in construing the
statutory term "branch" the Court should consider the aspects of the transaction "that might
give the [national] bank an advantage in its competition. . . ." 396 U.S. at 136-37. By




ing that achieves an effective rate beyond the statutory maximum,
the state's interpretation applies to national banks by virtue of 12
U.S.C. § 85.
IV. COMMENT
If the instant case, rather than Northway, is to become the
accepted rule in the area of discounting, consumers and state lend-
ers will be protected while the national bank-lenders will be bur-
dened only slightly, if at all. National banks located in states that
permit state lenders to discount loans at the maximum rate, with-
out regard to the actual yield, will not be affected. National banks
located in states that permit state lenders to discount only to the
extent that the actual yield is within the statutory maximum will
need to change their practices merely by charging the statutory rate
only when it becomes due, or by charging a lower rate in advance
that yields an effective rate not in excess of the maximum. Further-
more, the impact of the instant decision on national banks will be
practically limited to consumer loans, because of the usual exemp-
tion of corporations from usury laws 33 and of section 85's higher
alternative rate for business or agricultural loans.34 This limited
restriction on the national banks will be justified by its beneficent
effect on the borrower35 and on the competing state lenders, 3 who
33. Typically, a corporation may not plead usury as a defense. Over thirty states ex-
empt loans to corporations from the usury ceilings. Indeed, it has been estimated that usury
laws cover only 40-50% of lending. M. Benfield, Jr., Usury Laws and Consumer Credit, 26
Bus. LA YER 787 (1971).
34. The amendment to section 85, enacted October 28, 1974, that permits the national
bank-lender of a business or agricultural loan to choose the higher of the state rate or 5% in
excess of the local Federal Reserve discount rate, provides a means to avoid completely any
state rate that is below market rate. (See note 6 supra for the provisions of section 85). Pub.
L. No. 93-501, § 201 (Oct. 29, 1974).
35. The public regulation of banking to preserve banking competition . . . aims
primarily at protecting users of bank credit, by preventing their monopolistic exploita-
tion by banks. . . . Its method consists of attempting to assure borrowers of a reasonable
number of alternative sources of credit accommodations.
C. Kreps, Modernizing Banking Regulation, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 670 (1966).
The argument that the instant decision will further restrict consumers' access to loan
funds because national banks will be unable to make low interest loans at a profit fails to
consider that the national bank's rate ceiling is determined by the preferred lender rate,
which may be as high as 25%, or higher. Thus, while the state bank's low interest rate may
sometimes render consumer loans prohibitive, the national bank's preferred rate will seldom
have such a result.
Granted, in the few states having a lower preferred rate, such as Arkansas, the rate
ceilings may limit the availability of consumer credit and ensure the existence of gray markets
and loan sharking. The solution in these states is to enable consumers to obtain loans not by
applying state rates unevenly to state lenders and national banks, but by revising usury
statutes in an evenhanded manner toward all lenders. For a thorough discussion of the effects
of rate ceilings on consumer loans and the solutions offered by the UCCC, see Symposium,
Consumer Credit in the 70's, 26 Bus. LAwYER 753, 753-904 (1971).
36. The cost of money to state banks, not members of the Federal Reserve, is invariably
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have always been subject to the state restrictions.37 The restriction
is justified not only on the above equitable grounds, but also on
logical and legal grounds. A discounted installment loan creates a
greater burden on the borrower than does a discounted single
payment short-term loan, and therefore deserves special treatment.
Both types of loans yield a gain to the lender in excess of the stipu-
lated rate because the interest is based on the face amount of the
note rather than on the net principal actually lent. The installment
loan, however, increases this excess yield because the interest is
based on the full amount of the prinicpal, without allowance for its
progressive reduction by the periodic payments through the course
of the loan. While one might tolerate the first excess, shared by both
loans, as de minimus and justified by banking convenience, one
might not so easily tolerate the added excess, unique to the install-
ment note, on the same grounds. Because of the distinction, the
same court that decided Evans in favor of national banks might well
decide an installment loan case in favor of the borrower. By confin-
ing Evans to its facts3 8 the Supreme Court would be reaffirming its
higher than the cost to national banks and member state-chartered banks, because of the
Fed's lender-of-last resort policy. Although the state bank may have a more liberal reserve
requirement, once it has exhausted its own liquid assets short of the reserve it faces a liquidity
crisis when it cannot borrow funds at reasonable rates. In view of the advantages afforded
the national banks by the Federal Reserve System, the national bank would receive a compet-
itive windfall if given discounting privileges not allowed to state banks. See generally, Part
I: Banking Regulation, 31 LAw & CONTsMP. PROB. 635, 635-773 (1966).
37. For a discussion of the importance of maintaining the duality of our banking system
through competitive equality, see Comment, 58 IowA L. REv. 1250, 1266-67; Davis, Banking
Regulation Today: A Banker's View, 31 LAW & ComT. PROi. 639, 643 (1966); E. Redford,
Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 749, 770-71 (1966).
Foremost among the arguments favoring the dual system are the goals of innovation,
initiative and independence, inherent in the nation's system of federalism. Both the state and
national systems have contributed progressive innovation, but particularly noteworthy are
the state's introduction of branching, loans on real estate and fiduciary operations, all of
which were later incorporated into the competing federal system.
38. At least one commentator suggests that the Evans rule is desirable when confined
to federal rejection of unusual and unreasonable state restrictions. A body of federal law
would replace foolish restrictions of local usury laws, thereby forcing state legislatures to
amend their laws to allow local lenders to compete successfully with national banks. H.
Shanks, Special Usury Problems Applicable to National Banks, 87 BANK. L.J. 483, 497-500
(1970).
One response to this approval of the creation of federal common law in unusual rate cases
is that the impetus to state law revision should come from somewhere other than another body
issuing its own set of bank regulations. Already lending institutions are subject to the laws,
regulation and supervision of agencies of fifty states and of at least five federal agencies.
Further segmentation of that regulatory scheme by permitting the Supreme Court to estab-
lish a federal common law in hard cases is hardly desirable. Because of the problems inherent
[Vol. 28
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own position of adherence to state interpretations, as it declared in
Union National Bank and Citizens National Bank, and remaining
faithful to its policy of "competitive equality" between national
banks and state lenders, as it announced in two recent National
Bank Act cases .9 To permit national banks to discount loans in a
manner denied state lenders would not only result in an unwar-
ranted extension of Evans, but also would result in an unwise exten-
sion of Tiffany by placing national banks free of all limitations
imposed upon the preferred state lenders, thereby protecting na-
tional banks from the legitimate and desirable competition contem-
plated by the nation's dual banking system.
LINDA A. BUNSEY
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Punitive
Damages in Defamation Actions Brought by
Public Figures Chill First Amendment Rights and
Are Unconstitutional Unless Narrowly and
Necessarily Promoting Compelling State Interest
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendant,' a public figure who had been sued by a public
figure2 for defamation,3 moved for partial summary judgment to
preclude recovery of punitive damages after he had been found lia-
in sanctioning a federal common law in this area, it is arguable that the instant decision
would be desirable even if the discount restrictions in Arkansas were unduly onerous to
lenders.
39. See cases cited note 32 supra. Accord, Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S.
559, 564-65 (1934).
Interestingly, Retired Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, who wrote the Walker opinion,
was one of the three judges participating in the instant decision. His participation may lend
some weight to speculation that the Supreme Court today would reaffirm the policy of parity
expressed in Walker. In particular, note Justice Clark's statement in Walker that "[i]t is a
strange argument that permits one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds him."
385 U.S. at 261. Hopefully, the Supreme Court would find it a strange argument that permits
a national bank to choose the state statutory rate and choose not to follow state law construing
and applying that rate.
1. Defendant Hughes Tool Company (now known as Summa Corporation) assumed
responsibility for its sole shareholder, Howard R. Hughes.
2. The parties had stipulated that both Hughes and his former employee, plaintiff
Robert A. Maheu, were public figures and that the subject matter concerned a public event.
3. During a telephonic press conference on January 7, 1972, in reference to plaintiff,
Hughes stated, "[Hie's a no-good, dishonest son-of-a-bitch, and he stole me blind. ...
[Y]ou wouldn't think it could be possible with modem methods of bookkeeping and so forth
for a thing like the Maheu theft to have occurred, but believe me it did, because the money
is gone and he's got it."
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ble by a jury in the first phase of a bifurcated trial.' Contending that
punitive damages chill rights granted under the first amendment,5
defendant challenged the constitutionality of awarding punitive
damages in a defamation suit brought by a public figure. Plaintiff
maintained that both compensatory and punitive damages could be
awarded when "actual malice"6 accompanied defamation of a pub-
lic figure, because the state's interests in protecting reputation and
privacy were important and substantial. Plaintiff further asserted
that punitive damages, which were specifically allowed under a Cal-
ifornia statute7 upon a showing of "ill will," 8 would be especially
appropriate if reprehensible conduct could be proved. Rejecting
plaintiff's arguments, the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California, held, defendant's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment granted. A state's attempt to protect reputation and
privacy by granting punitive damages in defamation actions
brought by public figures has an unconstitutional chilling effect
upon the exercise of first amendment rights unless the attempt is
manifested in a statute that narrowly and necessarily promotes a
compelling state interest. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp.
166 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
If. BACKGROUND
Defamation law was developed in response to the recognition
that "the truth never catches up with the lie . . . ." and was de-
signed to promote avoidance of self-help methods, such as the feud
and duel, by inducing resort to courts for civilized relief. Its pur-
poses are compensation, vindication, and deterrence, and the tradi-
tional remedy is an award of compensatory damages. Additionally,
although a few states do not permit recovery of punitive damages
4. Defendant had admitted that Hughes' utterance satisfied all elements necessary to
fix liability, if the jury found that the utterance was untrue. Moreover, defendant had con-
ceded that Hughes' utterance was made with actual malice, if the jury found that the utter-
ance was untrue.
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
6. See text accompanying note 20 infra.
7. "Exemplary damages; when allowable: In an action for the breach of an obligation
not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West
1970). Punitive damages also are known as exemplary or vindictive damages.
8. Ill will is the common law definition of malice.
9. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267, 300.
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because the propriety and amount of these awards usually are ques-
tions left to the unbridled discretion of the jury and the award of
compensatory damages is considered adequate to serve the purposes
of defamation law,'I most states do allow recovery of punitive dam-
ages, when malice is shown, as a dissuasion from and penalty for
defamation." Prior to 1964, however, a majority of states recognized
a qualified privilege of "fair comment,' 2 which allowed all mem-
bers of society to offer any comment, criticism, or opinion concern-
ing any public figure or issue, 13 and a minority extended this privi-
lege to those who in good faith offered misstatements of fact con-
cerning these public topics."
Although the guarantees of free speech and press embodied in
the Bill of Rights seem an obvious restriction upon defamation law,
10. In Washington, punitive damages are not allowed in defamation cases. Farrar v.
Tribune Pub. Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961); Ott v. Press Pub. Co., 40 Wash.
308, 82 P. 403 (1905). Indeed, they are not allowed in any tort cases. Spokane Truck & Dray
Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891) (The court stated, "The plaintiff is made entirely
whole. The bond has been paid in full. Surely the public can have no interest in exacting the
pound of flesh. . . . It is to be presumed that the state has fully protected its own interests,
or as fully at least as they could be protected by laws, when it provides for the punishment
of crime in criminal statutes. . . ." Id. at 53, 25 P. at 1074.). In Indiana, punitive damages
are not allowed in defamation cases when the defendant is subject to criminal prosecution.
Wabash Print. & Pub. Co. v. Crumine, 123 Ind. 89, 21 N.E. 904 (1889). In Connecticut,
punitive damages are limited in defamation cases to the cost to the plaintiff of litigation, less
taxable costs. Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 72 A.2d 820 (1950); Hassett
v. Carroll, 85 Coni. 23, 81 A. 1013 (1911). Indeed, they are so limited in all tort cases. Hanna
v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. 492, 62 A. 785 (1906) (The court said that the doctrine of punitive
damages in other states i wrong because "the amount of punitive damages that might be
awarded [is] left almost entirely to the discretion of the jury. . . ."Id. at 493, 62 A. at 785.).
11. See, e.g., Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911); Childers v. San Jose
Mercury Print. & Pub. Co., 105 Cal. 284, 38 P. 903 (1894); Toomey v. Farley, 2 N.Y.2d 71,
138 N.E.2d 221, 156 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1956), in which the court stated,
"Punitive or exemplary damages are intended to act as a deterrent upon the libelor so
that he will not repeat the offense, and to serve as a warning to others. They are intended
as punishment for gross misbehavior for the good of the public and have been referred
to as 'a sort of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the imposition of a
criminal fine.' Punitive damages are allowed on the ground of public policy and not
because the plaintiff has suffered any monetary damages for which he is entitled to
reimbursement; the award goes to him simply because it is assessed in his particular
suit. The damages may be considered expressive of the community attitude towards one
who willfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury to another."
Id. at 83, 138 N.E.2d at 228, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (quoting from Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F.
Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955)).
See generally Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
12. See generally Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional Limitations
on State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (1965). A qualified privilege provides
conditional immunity; it protects a defamer from liability, unless bad faith and knowledge
of falsity are shown.
13. See, e.g., Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893) (the leading case).
14. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) (the leading case).
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it was not until 1964 that the Supreme Court applied the first
amendment to this body of law. The Court in 1925 did make these
freedoms applicable to the states'5 and in 1931 did proscribe prior
restraints.'" Later, in the 1959 decision of Barr v. Matteo,7 the Court
granted an absolute privilege to federal officials to utter defamatory
statements in the course of their duties. Barr also contained a por-
tentous dissent" urging a balancing of interests between defamer
and defamed. Finally, in 1964 the Court decided New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,'" a suit by a city commissioner for defamatory publi-
cation of a paid advertisement that falsely described his treatment
of protesters. In a decision by Justice Brennan, the Court held that
a "public official" could recover only if he proved clearly and con-
vincingly "that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."2 Thus, the Court had set a strong
standard against liability for the defamer and consequently had
placed in jeopardy recovery of both compensatory and punitive
damages by the defamed. The rationale underlying the Court's
holding was two-fold: the need to balance the privilege granted in
Barr to public officials against the interests of others, and the need
to discourage self-censorship and encourage public discussion un-
hampered by fear of large damage recoveries in defamation ac-
tions.2' Three concurring justices2 2 urged that these bases required
an absolute privilege-a position doggedly maintained by this mi-
nority in later cases.2
During the next seven years, the Court attempted to build upon
its Sullivan foundation and to clarify the first amendment's effect
in this new area of federal law. The Court's decisions, broadening
the class against whom the constitutional privilege could be invoked
15. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
16. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
18. Id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Id. at 279-80.
21. The Court said, "[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. . . ." Id. at 270.
22. Id. at 293, 297 (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring, & Goldberg & Douglas, J.J.,
concurring).
23. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 95 S. Ct. 465, 471 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Garri-
son v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). An absolute privilege
provides complete immunity; it protects a defamer from liability, even if bad faith and
knowledge of falsity could be shown.
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from public officials to "public figures" 24 and applying the first
amendment to the area of privacy, 25 seemed to support predictions
that the nature of events would replace the status of persons as the
controlling determinant for invocation of the privilege21 and ap-
peared to indicate a move toward the absolute privilege position
espoused by the minority in Sullivan. Further, the Court necessarily
abandoned privilege balancing2 in favor of an approach that bal-
anced the interests of defamer and defamed,2 and after vacillating
between strict and mild interpretations of "reckless disregard," the
Court eventually seemed to adopt the latter as part of its actual
malice standard .2  Nevertheless, viewed now in retrospect, seven
years after Sullivan, three key problems still remained: 1) the stan-
dard of liability for the defamer, 2) the standard for recovery against
the defamer, and 3) the remedies in addition to or in lieu of damages
for the defamed.
The Court's 1971 and 1974 decisions in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
24. See, e.g., Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Although it has relied upon first
amendment analysis, the Court continually has attempted to distinguish cases concerning
defamation and invasion of privacy through false light in the public eye. See, e.g., Cantrell
v. Forest City Pub. Co., 95 S. Ct. 465 (1974). At least one eminent commentator, however,
finds an historical link between the privileges of publicizing the activities of those already in
the public eye and of giving publicity to news, the two being "only different phases of the
same thing." PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 823 (4th ed. 1971).
26. See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191.
27. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (The Court stated, "[W]e reject
any suggestion that our references in New York Times. . .to Barr v. Mateo mean that we
have tied the New York Times rule to the rule of official privilege. The public interests
protected by the New York Times rule are interests in discussion, not retaliation. . . ... Id.
at 84-85 n.10.). The Court's abandonment of privilege balancing was necessitated by its
broadening of the class against whom the constitutional privilege could be invoked from
public officials to public figures.
28. Balancing tests are customary in other first amendment areas. In prior restraint
analysis, a presumption of invalidity also appears. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). One commentator has stated,
Prior restraints are traditionally subject to a presumption of invalidity which only the
most compelling government interest can rebut. Although a balancing of interests is thus
implicit in prior restraint analysis, it takes place only after a general determination that
prior restraints are a peculiarly invidious infringement. The scales in the subsequent
balance are thus set in advance against the governiment interests served by such re-
straints.
The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 178 (1974). See generally Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
29. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (The Court said that reckless
disregard comprised situations in which "the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he
was circulating false information" or in which he "in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication." Id. at 731.); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Henry
v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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media, Inc.3 ° and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.31 attempted to resolve
these problems. In Rosenbloom, a suit by a magazine distributor for
defamatory publication of radio newscasts that falsely described
him and his magazines as lewd, the Court held the Sullivan actual
malice standard applicable, even though Rosenbloom was a private
figure, and consequently he received neither compensatory nor pu-
nitive damages. The plurality opinion by Justice Brennan for three
members of the Court emphasized again the need for debate on
public issues and the need to dissuade self-censorship, and the opin-
ion attempted to discard the public figure test in favor of a "public
event" test, which the plurality thought balanced more meaning-
fully the public's right to know against the individual's right to
privacy. Justice Brennan also mentioned retraction and right-to-
reply statutes as alternative remedies for the defamed.32 Justices
Marshall and Stewart in a joint dissent 3  and Justice Harlan in a
separate dissent 34 favored retention of the public figure test and
proposed a milder negligence standard, as opposed to the actual
malice standard, for recovery of compensatory damages by private
persons. Regarding recovery of punitive damages by private
persons, Justices Marshall and Stewart advocated abolition, and
Justice Harlan suggested a modified actual malice standard with
unspecified control upon jury discretion.35 Justice Harlan also sug-
gested that the bases for a distinction between public and private
figures were that public figures voluntarily have thrust themselves
into the vortex of public activity and have effective opportunity to
communicate rebuttal, but Justice Brennan rejected this two-
pronged rationale as "at best, a legal fiction."3
Justice Harlan's Rosenbloom view, however, was adopted in
Gertz by five justices.37 In Gertz, a suit by an attorney for defama-
tory publication of an article that falsely described him as commun-
ist, the Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Powell, immediately
returned the focus in defamation cases to the public-private figure
dichotomy, stated that it had "no difficulty in distinguishing among
30. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
31. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Justice Black in a concurring opinion again advocated an absolute privilege. 403
U.S. at 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 78 (Marshall & Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. In a concurring opinion Justice White concluded that five justices favored a limita-
tion upon punitive damages-the three dissenters, Justice Black and the absent Justice
Douglas. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 48.




defamation plaintiffs,"38 and determined that Gertz was a private
figure. Then, relying upon Justice Harlan's two-pronged rationale,39
the Court held that awards of compensatory damages should be
determined according to a negligence standard for private persons
and the actual malice standard for public persons. Additionally, the
Court stated that compensatory damages could be awarded for
"out-of-pocket loss, . . . impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suf-
fering."4 The Court also held that neither private nor public persons
should recover punitive damages, "at least when liability is not
based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth."'" The Court stated that although punitive damages are
"levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
its future occurrence," states have no substantial interest in grant-
ing these "gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any
actual injury," when juries "remain free to use their discretion selec-
tively to punish expressions of unpopular views. 4 2 Accordingly, the
Court felt that Gertz should not recover punitive damages.4 3 Justice
Brennan in dissent" again mentioned retraction statutes as an alter-
native remedy for the defamed. Justice Blackmun in a separate
opinion45 felt that with Gertz the law finally had "come to rest in
")46the defamation area ....
38. 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
39. The Court stated,
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the chan-
nels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counter-
act false statements than private individuals normally enjoy ...
. . . An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case ...
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position. . . . For the most part
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society . . . [and] have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public contro-
versies. . . . [Tihey invite attention and comment.
.. . [Tihe communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that
public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. No such assumption is justified
with respect to a private individual.
Id. at 344-45.
40. Id. at 350.
41. Id. at 349.
42. Id. at 350.
43. Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion again advocated an absolute privilege. Id.
at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court initially noted that the issue of first amend-
ment preclusion of punitive damages in a defamation action
brought by a public figure was of first impression and then cited the
Supreme Court's recent aversion to punitive damages in defamation
suits by quoting from the majority opinion in Gertz and Justices
Marshall and Stewart in Rosenbloom. Next the court determined
that punitive damages have a chilling effect upon first amendment
rights because of the threats of costly litigation and great compensa-
tory recoveries and said that the Sullivan actual malice standard
provides protection only at the threshold of liability. Reasoning that
self-censorship, especially of unpopular views, still would be invited
by fear of punitive damages, the court held that punitive damages
could not be awarded to public figures in defamation actions "un-
less they narrowly and necessarily further important and substan-
tial state interests. '47 Applying this analysis, the court then identi-
fied two state interests-the protections of reputation and pri-
vacy-but rejected them as not compelling. The first interest was
minimized by the specter of costly litigation, the broad definition
of compensatory damages in Gertz, and the two-pronged rationale
employed in Gertz to distinguish public figures; the second interest
was minimized by the public figure's presumed consent to invasion
of privacy. Thus, the court concluded that both interests were out-
weighed by considerations of the public's right to know and the first
amendment. Additionally, the court found in the California stat-
ute48 a third, more important and more substantial state inter-
est-protection "when reputation and privacy are threatened by the
special dangers flowing from highly motivated, tortious conduct,
i.e., reprehensible conduct that is motivated by ill will,"49 a situa-
tion in which more than just actual malice is present. Although the
court accepted the state's conclusion that greater probability and
larger magnitude of harm would result when a tort is committed
under aggravated circumstances, it nevertheless rejected this third
interest as not compellifng in defamation actions brought by public
figures. While recognizing the two-pronged rationale employed in
Gertz, the court preferred to rest its rejection upon another ground:
the California statute's use of punitive damages as the means to
protect against the special dangers was too drastic. Because the jury
had unbridled discretion to determine the propriety and amount of
47. 384 F. Supp. at 170.
48. See note 7 supra.
49. 384 F. Supp. at 172.
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punitive damages and hence to punish unpopular views, the court
found that the approach chosen was not narrowly restricted to de-
terrence of reprehensible conduct. The court further found that this
overbroad approach was not necessarily required for deterrence of
the proscribed conduct because feasible alternative remedies were
available." Thus, as to this third interest, the court invalidated that
part of the statute allowing recovery of punitive damages by public
figures in defamation suits as an unconstitutional violation of the
first amendment. Therefore, the court concluded that because the
grant of punitive damages in a defamation action brought by a
public figure has a chilling effect upon the exercise of first amend-
ment rights, the recovery of these awards is unconstitutional unless
they narrowly and necessarily promote a compelling state interest.
IV. COMMENT
With the instant decision, federal defamation law has advanced
within the space of ten years from no constitutional privilege, even
for the press in defending against a public person, to the realized
prospect of a constitutional privilege so sweeping that it prevents
recovery of an element of damages by a public person who has been
defamed by an individual. Specifically, the instant court's holding
completes a four-part scheme for liability and damages in defama-
tion actions: under Supreme Court decisions, a private figure must
prove negligence to receive compensatory damages and actual mal-
ice to receive punitive damages, and a public figure must prove
actual malice to recover compensatory damages; under the instant
decision, a public figure is almost totally precluded from recovering
punitive damages. As the Sullivan Court in large measure adopted
the minority position concerning fair comment and liability, so too
the Maheu court in large measure adopted the minority position
concerning punitive damages. 51 Nevertheless, the instant decision
was solidly based: the court fully considered the Supreme Court's
prior concerns with encouraging debate and discouraging self-
censorship, shielding reputation and privacy, and, most impor-
tantly, scrutinizing the need for punitive damages.12
50. The court listed 4 potential alternatives: 1) a ceiling upon punitive damages, 2) a
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages, 3) criminal sanctions against defamation,
and 4) recovery of court costs and attorney's fees.
51. See note 10 supra.
52. The court did not mention possible constitutional differences between libel and
slander, falsehoods and insults, defamation by a public figure and by the press, and freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. The first phase of the bifurcated trial in the instant case




In one area, however, the instant court did break new ground.
By presuming the invalidity of punitive damages and hence requir-
ing the showing of a compelling state interest, the court added a new
dimension to the balancing process in defamation actions brought
by public figures. This setting of the scales in advance provides
greater protection for speech and the press than does the Supreme
Court's ad hoc balancing approach. Thus, the instant court's analy-
sis would leave the door to punitive damages only slightly ajar for
public figures and implicitly almost totally open for private figures.
In distinguishing between public and private figures, however, the
court relied heavily upon the Gertz two-pronged rationale-a for-
mulation that has been intensely criticized. 3 As to the public fig-
ure's voluntary exposure to publicity, Justice Brennan has stated,
"[T]he idea that certain 'public' figures have voluntarily exposed
their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have
kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal
fiction."5 As to the public figure's capacity for rebuttal, Justice
Powell himself has stated, "[A]n opportunity for rebuttal seldom
suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood."55 Moreover, in dis-
tinguishing between public and private figures, the instant court did
not mention and the majority in Gertz apparently minimized two
important state interests that seem applicable to all persons: the
state interests in preserving defamation law firstly because it re-
flects the "basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being"56 and secondly because it "aids democracy when it
deters wholly unfounded smear campaigns. 5 7 Nevertheless, the in-
stant court's completion of the four-part scheme for liability and
damages is consistent with the implications of Gertz.
Whether the Supreme Court ultimately will follow its own
suggestions in Gertz and the lead of the instant case or will adopt
completely the suggestions and lead of Justice Harlan in
Rosenbloom is an open question. If the Court follows the latter
53. See, e.g., The Supreme. Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 41 (1974), in which it
is stated, "Properly to determine which social roles subject their occupants to being classified
as public figures is, however, a difficult task." Id. at 145. "The Gertz Court's 'social role' test
is problematic because it is vague and perhaps capricious in application . . . ." Id. at 145
n.37. "Thus, there appears to be no bright-line test for determining when increased publicity
is an actual social expectation; rather, the test appears to be based on an ad hoc sociological
perception." Id. at 145-46.
54. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
56. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
57. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. Rzv. 41, 147 n.50 (1974). See generally




course and expressly adopts the Sullivan actual malice standard for
recovery of punitive damages by both private and public figures,
then the law truly may come to rest in the defamation area or, at
most, future disputes will be limited only to clarifying the definition
of reckless disregard. If the Court follows the former course and
adopts a presumption of invalidity, then recovery of punitive dam-
ages eventually might be endangered for both public and private
figures. This was the result advocated by Justices Marshall and
Stewart in Rosenbloom as the necessary method to dissuade self-
censorship. Thus, although the instant court ostensibly followed the
dictates of Gertz, which seemed to slow or even reverse the momen-
tum toward an absolute constitutional privilege, the instant deci-
sion ironically may have speeded this momentum. Additionally,
further impetus toward adoption of the absolute privilege position
are the fears expressed by the court in Maheu that the broad defini-
tion of compensatory damages in Gertz still allows great jury discre-
tion and engenders self-censorship and that the high costs of litigat-
ing a defamation suit deter fearless publication.
In any event, because recovery of punitive damages, at least for
public figures, now may be more difficult, less drastic alternatives
are needed to deter defamation. The instant court's first two sug-
gested alternatives, a ceiling upon punitive damages and a ratio
between compensatory and punitive damges, are subject to the
same infirmities as are punitive damages in general. The third and
fourth alternatives, criminal sanctions against defamation and re-
covery of court costs and attorney's fees, each of which already is
employed in at least one state,5 are feasible surrogates. Neverthe-
less, the possibility exists that a defamation may go without redress
and that the defamed may have no opportunity to vindicate reputa-
tion, either because he cannot satisfy the requisite liability standard
or because an absolute constitutional privilege eventually may be
adopted. The potential remedies for these situations are numerous.
Although the Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo5' recently dealt an apparent deathblow to right-to-reply
statutes, the possibility of paid rebuttal advertisements remains. 0
A more efficient and economical alternative, however, is the retrac-
tion statute.' In both his dissenting opinion in Gertz and his concur-
58. See note 10 supra.
59. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
60. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 180 (1974).
61. See generally Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment
II, 42 COLuM. L. REv. 1282 (1942); Comment, Reply and Retraction in Actions Against the
Press for Defamation: The Effect of Tornillo and Gertz, 43 FoRDHAM L. REv. 223 (1974).
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ring opinion in Tornillo,6 ' Justice Brennan noted that a retraction
statute affording relief on a strict liability basis to plaintiffs able to
prove defamatory falsehood by requiring public retraction without
an assessment of damages probably would be constitutional. An-
other possible solution is a declaratory judgment without retraction,
which also would provide for truth, vindication, and no compensa-
tion. Finally, a combination of these alternatives may serve best the
interests of the defamed and the defamer, of society and the Consti-
tution. For example, a declaratory judgment, and if necessary a
public retraction, could be joined with an award of court costs and
attorney's fees. This solution in effect would combine absolute free-
dom with absolute liability but would not have the chilling impact
occasioned by punitive or even compensatory damages.
Thus, as is evidenced by the availability of these alternatives,
current limitations upon defamation law affect only recovery of
damages and not the existence of a cause of action. Nevertheless,
freedom of speech and freedom of the press remain specific com-
mands of the first amendment, and as the Supreme Court has inti-
mated recently, although responsible speech and a responsible press




Habeas Corpus Relief Available When State
Statute Permits Post-Guilty Plea Appellate
Review of Constitutional Challenges
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Respondent, arrested for violating a New York loitering stat-
ute,' was charged with loitering and two narcotics offenses2 on the
basis of evidence obtained in a search incident to his arrest. Alleging
the unconstitutionality of the loitering statute and, therefore, the
62. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 256.
1. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1967).
2. Respondent was charged with possession of a dangerous drug, fourth degree, N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 220.05 (now codified as modified as N.Y. PEN. LAw. § 220.03 (McKinney 1973)),




illegality of the resulting search, respondent moved to suppress the
narcotics evidence, 3 but the New York City Criminal Court found
him guilty of the loitering charge and denied his motion to suppress.
On the date scheduled for trial on the drug charges, respondent
withdrew his prior pleas of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty
to a lesser drug offense.' Simultaneously, respondent, relying on a
New York statute5 that permits an appeal challenging certain con-
stitutional defects' after a guilty plea has been accepted, announced
his intention to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and his
loitering conviction. After unsuccessfully exhausting his direct ap-
peals,7 respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' in
federal district court. Prior to the district court's decision on the
merits of respondent's petition, the New York Court of Appeals
declared the loitering statute unconstitutional,' and in response to
this decision the district court granted respondent's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed'0 both the grant of habeas corpus 1 and the invalidation of the
loitering statute.2 To resolve a conflict between circuits, 3 the Su-
3. Respondent advanced three arguments to support his motion: (1) the arresting officer
did not have probable cause to arrest him; (2) the evidence introduced was insufficient to
support the loitering conviction; and (3) the loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague
and, therefore, could not support the loitering conviction or a search incident to arrest.
4. Respondent pleaded guilty to the interesting charge of attempted possession of dan-
gerous drugs. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1967). He was sentenced to ninety days
imprisonment for the attempted possession conviction and was given an unconditional release
on the loitering conviction.
5. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-c, now recodified as N.Y. CRim. Paoc. LAw §§ 710.20(1),
710.70(2) (McKinney 1971).
6. N.Y. CPum. PRoc. LAw §§ 710.20(1), 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971) authorize appeal of
an adverse ruling on a claim of unlawful search and seizure; N.Y. Crim PROC. LAW §§
710.20(3), 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971) permit a similar appeal from a denial of a motion to
suppress an allegedly coerced confession; N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW §§ 710.20(5), 710.70(2)
(McKinney 1971) permit an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress an identification
allegedly influenced by improper pretrial identifications. California has a similar statute
permitting appeal from certain adverse pretrial rulings despite subsequent entry of a guilty
plea. CAL. PzNAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (West 1967).
7. The Appellate Term of the New York Supreme Court reversed the loitering convic-
tion on the basis of insufficient evidence and a defective information, but found that probable
cause to arrest the respondent was present and, therefore, upheld the challenged search. The
New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal and the United States Supreme Court
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Newsome v. New York, 405 U.S. 908 (1972).
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq. (1970).
9. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1093 (1973).
10. United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 1169-71, 1174-75.
12. The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide
adequate standards of conduct for prosecutors, police or the judiciary. Id. at 1171-74.
13. In Mann v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974),
the Court of Appeals held that a guilty plea barred federal habeas corpus relief under a
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preme Court granted certiorari" and held, affirmed. When a state
statutory scheme permits a defendant to plead guilty without for-
feiting his right to appellate review of specified constitutional is-
sues, the defendant is not barred from pursuing those issues in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 43
U.S.L.W. 4284 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1975).
I. BACKGROUND
A criminal defendant's decision to plead guilty has far-reaching
and pervasive effects, because he waives not only all nonjurisdic-
tional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings, 5 but also his
fundamental constitutional rights of trial by jury,'" protection
against compulsory self-incrimination,' 7 and confrontation of his
accusers.18 Recognizing the seriousness of these consequences, the
courts have insisted that defendant's plea be made voluntarily and
knowingly if it is to operate as a waiver of these constitutional
rights.'9 In Johnston v. Zerbst,20 the Supreme Court enunciated the
classic definition of this waiver standard as an "intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."12' Several
subsequent cases 22 held that a defendant's guilty plea, obtained by
pressure or coercion, would not operate as a waiver of his right
collaterally to attack his conviction in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.? Another case that exemplified the Court's willingness to
invalidate guilty pleas because of pretrial irregularities was
Machibroda v. United States,24 in which the Supreme Court re-
California statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (West 1967), quite similar to the New York
provision.
14. 417 U.S. 967 (1974). Certiorari was limitied to the question whether a state defen-
dant's guilty plea waives federal habeas corpus review of his conviction if, under that state's
procedure, such post-conviction review is authorized.
15. United States ex reL. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1965).
16. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
19. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942);
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
20. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
21. Id. at 464.
22. Pennsylvania ex reL. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Walker v. Johnston,
312 U.S. 275 (1941).
23. In Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), the defendant petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his guilty plea was the result of the threats and coercion of a
police official. The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, granted the writ on the grounds
that "if his plea was so coerced as to deprive it of validity to support the conviction, the
coercion likewise deprived it of validity as a waiver of his right to assail the conviction." Id.
at 104.
24. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
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versed the dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus sought by a
defendant who alleged that his guilty plea had been obtained by
coercive tactics. The Court ruled that when a defendant in a federal
court is not personnally questioned by the trial judge concerning the
voluntary nature of his plea, as required by Rule 11, Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure,2 his conviction is open to subsequent collat-
eral attack.26 In Fay v. Noia,27 the Supreme Court continued to
explore the concept of waiver and its effect upon the availability of
federal habeas corpus relief. Defendant, who had been convicted
solely upon the admission of a concededly coerced confession, chose
not to pursue an appeal because he feared a new trial might result
in the imposition of the death penalty.2 Rejecting the argument
that habeas corpus review was barred by the defendant's failure to
exhaust state appellate procedures,2 19 the Supreme Court stated that
to operate as a waiver of all federal relief, the decision by a habeas
applicant to by-pass state remedies, made after consultation with
competent counsel, must be found to have been made knowingly
and understandingly, 31 whether for strategic, tactical or other delib-
erate reasons.3
1
Departing from these earlier decisions in which the Court had
considered pretrial events in determining the voluntariness issue,
the Court, in three 1970 decisions known as the Brady trilogy,32
25. "The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such a plea
* . . without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea
. . . . The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea." FED. R. CRim. P. 11.
26. 368 U.S. at 493. The requirement of strict adherence to Rule 11 was reaffirmed in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), when the Supreme Court held that even
though the defendant had stated a desire to plead guilty and was informed of the conse-
quences of the plea, a court, without directly questioning the defendant, could not assume
he had a complete understanding of the charge against him. 394 U.S. at 464. Although
McCarthy was directly applicable only to the federal courts, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64, its require-
ment of an affirmative showing of voluntariness on the record was impliedly extended to the
states in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
27. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
28. Id. at 439-40.
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970), which provides in part: "An application for a writ
of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State. .. "
30. "Under no reasonable view can the State's version of Noia's reason for not appealing
support an inference of deliberate by-passing of the state court system. For Noia to have
appealed in 1942 would have run a substantial risk of electrocution. . . . This was a choice
by Noia not to appeal, but . . . it cannot realistically be deemed. . a deliberate circumven-
tion of state procedures." Pay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963).
31. Id. at 439.
32. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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adopted a new approach that focused almost exclusively upon
whether, at the time of the plea, the defendant's decision to plead
guilty, based upon the advice of competent counsel, was voluntarily
and intelligently made. In the first of these cases, Brady v. United
States,3 defendant, represented by counsel, changed his plea from
not guilty to guilty on a kidnapping charge after a codefendant
agreed to testify on behalf of the prosecution. Eight years later he
sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his plea had been
obtained by the coercive effect of the penalty provision of the Fed-
eral Kidnapping Act 34 providing for the death penalty only upon the
recommendation of a jury. The defendant's plea had been entered
before this provision had been held unconstitutional35 as placing an
"impermissible burden ' 36 upon the exercise of the right to a jury
trial. Finding that the plea had been motivated by fear of the code-
fendant's testimony, and had not been coerced by the death penalty
provision, the Court affirmed the district court's action dismissing
the writ and held that the guilty plea had been voluntarily entered.3 7
The majority further stated that even if the defendant would not
have pleaded guilty except for this provision, this "does not neces-
sarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary
act. '38 The second case of the trilogy, McMann v. Richardson,39
consolidated three New York cases in which the defendants, alleging
that their guilty pleas had been prompted by illegally obtained
confessions, sought collateral relief." In reversing the grant of a
habeas hearing, the Court ruled that a defendant who alleges that
a prior coerced confession was the reason for his guilty plea is not,
without more, entitled to a hearing.' Each defendant had been
convicted not because of his prior confession, but by his "own ad-
mission in open court that he committed the acts with which he was
charged, 4 2 and as long as the advice he was given by counsel was
33. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970).
35. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
36. Id. at 572.
37. 397 U.S. at 748.
38. Id. at 750.
39. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
40. The three petitioners alleged varying degrees of physical and mental abuse, impro-
per police and judicial pressure, and ineffective representation of counsel. Id. at 761-64. Until
it was declared unconstitutional in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), New York proce-
dure provided that if a defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession, the trial
judge admitted the confession into evidence and submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury.
The McMann defendants claimed that because they had no constitutionally valid procedure
to challenge the voluntariness of their confessions, they were forced to plead guilty.
41. 397 U.S. at 768.
42. Id. at 766.
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"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases,"' 3 the conviction was not open to collateral attack.4 Another
1970 case, North Carolina v. Alford,45 presented the additional prob-
lem of whether collateral relief was available when the entry of
defendant's guilty plea was accompanied by protestations of inno-
cence. The defendant was charged with first degree murder and,
after examining the prosecution's case, defendant's counsel
recommended pleading guilty to a lesser charge to avoid the risk
that the death penalty could be imposed by a jury if the case went
to trial. 6 Although still claiming innocence, the defendant accepted
his attorney's advice and pleaded guilty to second degree murder.
In reversing the grant of a habeas corpus hearing,47 the Supreme
Court held that "while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver
of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not
a constitutional requisite to the impostion of criminal penalty. "48
Although recognizing that a substantial split of authority exists
concerning the permissibility of accepting a guilty plea
accompanied by protestations of innocence,49 the Court held that a
criminal defendant may voluntarily, knowingly, and understand-
ingly submit to a prison sentence even if he cannot or will not admit
that he committed the crime with which he is charged."
A 1973 decision, Tollett v. Henderson,51 construed this line of
cases and provided the forum for the Court's most explicit state-
ment of the narrowed scope of the voluntariness test. The defen-
dant, a Negro, had been indicted by a Tennessee grand jury for
43. Id. at 771. The Court held that counsel's failure to anticipate the ruling in Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), was not the type of "gross error" that would vitiate the knowing
and intelligent nature of the defendants' pleas. See note 40 supra.
44. The third case in the Brady trilogy, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970),
addressed essentially the same issues considered in McMann and Brady and held that an
intelligent and counseled guilty plea is not open to collateral attack because of alleged prior
constitutional defects.
45. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
46. North Carolina law provided life imprisonment as the maximum penalty for first
degree murder if a guilty plea was entered and accepted. If the defendant chose to go to trial,
the jury could recommend the death penalty. Before accepting the plea, the trial court heard
a summary presentation of the State's case, and received the defendant's testimony that he
was innocent but was pleading guilty to avoid the possible impostion of the death penalty.
Id. at 28-30.
47. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (see note 35 supra and accompanying text), held that the North
Carolina penalty scheme was so coercive as to render Alford's plea involuntary. Alford v.
North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).
48. 400 U.S. at 37.
49. Id. at 33-34.
50. Id. at 37.
51. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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murder and, on advice of counsel, had pleaded guilty. Twenty-five
years later he sought habeas corpus relief, claiming that Negroes
had been excluded systematically from the grand jury that indicted
him. In granting the petition for habeas corpus, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that since the facts relating to the unconstitutional grand
jury selection procedures were unknown to either the defendant or
his attorney, no voluntary and intelligent waiver of the constitu-
tional claims could have occurred. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed. Abandoning the content, if not the language, of the waiver
concept, the Court explicitly enunciated a new standard by stating
that a guilty plea represents a "break in the chain" of the events
preceding it in the criminal process. While noting that if the issue
was solely one of waiver, the court of appeals had been correct in
concluding that no waiver had occurred,5 2 the Court held that a
defendant may not raise claims relating to prior constitutional dep-
rivations once he has "solemnly admitted" his guilt in open court.
After the entry of a guilty plea, the events preceding the plea are
no longer subject to review, and only the voluntary and intelligent
nature of the plea itself is open to attack on the ground that coun-
sel's advice was not within the standards set forth in McMann.5 3
Under the Tollett standard, a federal court when considering an
application for federal habeas corpus is free to ignore claims of
constitutional errors arising prior to the entry of a guilty plea, and
should confine its inquiry to the competency of the legal advice
received by the defendant and to the voluntary and intelligent na-
ture of the defendent's decision to plead guilty instead of proceeding
to trial.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In rejecting the State's reliance upon the stated rule of the
Brady trilogy and Tollett,54 the instant Court noted the suggestion
originally made in a McMann footnote5 that an exception might
exist if the applicable state law permitted appeal from adverse
pretrial rulings despite a subsequent guilty plea. Under New York
procedure, a defendant who chooses to plead guilty does not deliber-
ately by-pass state appellate review of certain constitutional
52. Id. at 266.
53. Id. at 267.
54. At oral argument the New York Assistant Attorney General argued that McMann
and Tollett "stood for the proposition that a state conviction based on a guilty plea is immune
from all federal collateral attack except a challenge based on the validity of the plea itself."
16 BNA CRmI. L. REP. 4118 (Dec. 18, 1974).
55. 397 U.S. at 770 n.13.
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claims, 6 and the State acquires no legitimate expectation of finality
in the ensuing conviction. As to these constitutional claims, the plea
does not constitute a "break in the chain," but operates merely as
a procedural device to secure review of the adverse pretrial ruling
without the necessity of a time-consuming and expensive trial.57 The
Court held that because the respondent's guilty plea was entered in
reliance upon a guarantee of the availability of further appellate
review of his constitutional claims,58 it was essentially different from
guilty pleas entered in other states that result in an absolute convic-
tion and a waiver of all further state review. This difference led the
Court to conclude that respondent's conviction upon a guilty plea
was not meaningfully different from a conviction obtained as the
result of a trial. Since entirely different expectations surrounded the
plea, and entirely different legal consequences flowed therefrom, the
Court's holdings in the earlier guilty plea cases were simply inappos-
ite. The majority emphasized that the denial of a federal forum for
the respondent's claims not only would deprive him of federal ha-
beas corpus after he had satisfied all the prerequisites for that re-
lief,59 but also would frustrate New York's policy of encouraging the
entry of guilty pleas without diminishing a defendant's opportunity
to assert his constitutional rights. The Court indicated its approval
of the State's attempts to reduce the burden of unnecessary litiga-
tion by providing a statutory scheme to deter a defendant, con-
vinced that the State's case stands or falls according to the resolu-
tion of his constitutional claims, from forcing the State to conduct
a lengthy and expensive trial in order to preserve his right to chal-
lenge constitutional issues, on either appeal or application for fed-
eral habeas corpus relief."0 Recognizing that a contrary ruling would
substantially impair New York's efforts to relieve docket congestion
without sacrificing criminal defendants' fundamental rights, the
majority affirmed the grant of a habeas corpus hearing.
Writing in dissent, Justice White"' argued that under the prin-
56. See note 6 supra.
57. By hypothesis, the challenged evidence will be determinative of the outcome of the
case. Thus the constitutional challenges to the admissibility of the evidence would be the only
real issues on appeal whether the defendant pleaded guilty or was found guilty after a trial.
58. The Court rejected the state's claim that the law was intended only to permit review
in the state courts. 43 U.S.L.W. 4284, 4287 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1975).
59. The Court found that respondent was ";n custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1970), had alleged that his custody was in violation of the laws of the United States,
and had presented his federal claims to the state courts on direct appeal thus satisfying the
exhaustion requirement. Id. at 4287 n.8.
60. The Court termed the New York provisions "commendable efforts to relieve the
1roblem of congested trial calendars. . . ... Id. at 4287.
61. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
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ciples announced in the Brady trilogy and affirmed in Tollett, res-
pondent's voluntary and intelligent guilty plea foreclosed collateral
attack upon his conviction. 2 According to White, the New York
legislature's decision to allow post-guilty plea appeals of certain
constitutional issues in the state courts could not alter substantive
federal constitutional law. Rejecting the argument that the prior
decisions were based on the concept of waiver, the dissent stated
that "a guilty plea for federal purposes is a judicial admission of
guilt conclusively establishing a defendant's factual guilt. 63 More-
over, the dissent asserted that the availability of federal habeas
corpus relief is controlled by federal law, not state law, and thus the
Court should adhere to its Tollett holding that after a guilty plea
has been accepted, the only ground upon which habeas corpus relief
may be granted is a showing that the plea was not voluntarily and
knowingly entered. 4
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision creates a significant exception to the ra-
tionale enunciated in the Brady and Tollett cases. It marks a retreat
from the position under previous federal criminal law that, regard-
less of the circumstances, a guilty plea automatically and irrevoca-
bly waives the defendant's rights to appellate review of his constitu-
tional challenges. Although distinguishable because based on New
York's unusual statutory scheme, the decision indicates the Court's
willingness to abandon its highly formalistic treatment of guilty
pleas when dealing with state statutes that make important sub-
stantive changes in the expectations of defendants concerning the
opportunity of future appellate review of alleged constitutional
errors. While creating an exception to the Brady and Tollett ra-
tionale, 5 the result in the instant case is consistent with what
seems to be the unarticulated purpose underlying those deci-
sions-maintaining the integrity of the plea bargaining system.66
62. The dissent argued that the majority opinion rested upon the faulty premise that
in McMann and Tollett the Court had refused to hear the antecedent constitutional claims
because the defendants had by-passed these claims with a guilty plea. Justice White stated
that by-pass was not the basis of those cases; rather it was the defendants' conclusive admis-
sion of guilt that barred subsequent attack. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4288.
63. Id. at 4289.
64. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, wrote a sepa-
rate dissent based on the reasons set forth in his concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).
65. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
66. Although the concept of plea bargaining may be offensive to some, it is a practical
necessity and has been approved explicitly by the Supreme Court. In Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court stated that "[piroperly administered . . . [plea bargaining]
[Vol. 28
RECENT CASES
Plea bargaining is an essential ingredient of our criminal justice
system, for without it the courts would be heavily burdened by the
increased caseload . 7 Although currently more than ninety per cent 8
of all criminal cases are disposed of by guilty pleas, dockets are
crowded and long delays are common. If more defendants who were
guilty of the crimes with which they were charged could be encour-
aged to plead guilty without being forced to sacrifice their constitu-
tional challenges, the burden on the courts would be eased and the
trial process would be limited to cases in which there are genuine
disputes to be decided. 9 To be effective, however, a completed plea
bargain must be a final stopping place, and not a point of depar-
ture.70 The McMann and Tollett rationale indicates the Court's be-
lief that once a defendant has accepted the benefits of such negotia-
tions, whatever they may be, he should not be free subsequently to
attack the conviction; if he voluntarily and knowingly made an
agreement, he should be held to it. 71 In the vast majority of states,
when a defendant accepts a bargain, the state has a legitimate
expectation that the resulting conviction will be final; this is one of
the elements for which the state has bargained. Under these condi-
tions, the rigid and formalistic effect given the guilty plea under the
McMann and Tollett decisions is justifiable. New York and Califor-
nia, however, sought to make the choice of pleading guilty more
attractive by providing for a statutory post-guilty plea appeal proce-
dure that does not force a defendant to choose between going to trial
or sacrificing his constitutional claims. Under these statutes, all
parties realize that in exchange for relinquishment of his right to a
jury trial, the defendant's right to seek further review of his consti-
is to be encouraged." Id. at 260.
67. "The truth is, that a criminal court can operate only by inducing the great mass of
actually guilty defendants to plead guilty, paying in leniency the price for the pleas." H.
LUMMUS, THn TRIAL JUDGE 46 (1937). For arguments supporting the complete abolition of all
plea bargaining see NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS-TASK FORCE ON COURTS 46-49 (1973).
68. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION, THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL
3 (1966); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GuILTY 1-2 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
69. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 2.
70. Petitions for habeas corpus filed by state prisoners in District Court climbed from
1,020 in 1961, to 7,949 in 1972, an increase of more than 679%. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973, at 299.
71. While most decisions have dealt with cases in which the defendant was attempting
to avoid his obligations, a recent decision, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971),
indicates the Court's determination to hold the state to its bargain also. The Court granted
certiorari and reversed a conviction based on a guilty plea when, due to a change of personnel




tutional challenges is preserved. In view of the essentially proce-
dural function of the plea in this situation, the Court was justified
in refusing to give it the binding effect dictated by the earlier cases.
The instant decision insures that a defendant who chooses to utilize
this procedure will be provided with full appellate and habeas cor-
pus reviews with access to both the state and federal courts, and
thus maintains the attractiveness and usefulness of this state proce-
dure. Although currently in force only in New York and California,
this type of appeal procedure seems to be an effective and easily
implemented reform that other states could employ to mitigate the
problem of docket congestion by further encouraging plea bargain-
ing. If additional states adopt similar provisions, the instant case
will insure that the defendant's constitutional challenges will re-
ceive the fullest measure of both state and federal review.
CHARLES K. CAMPBELL, JR.
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-
Georgia Prejudgment Garnishment Statute
Violates Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by Failing to Provide Necessary
Procedural Safeguards in the Absence of Prior
Notice and Hearing.
I. FAcTs AND HOLDING
Plaintiff corporation, seller of goods, filed suit against defen-
dant corporation, purchaser, for an amount owing on open account
and simultaneously sought a writ of garnishment against defen-
dant's bank account.' Pursuant to the Georgia garnishment stat-
ute,2 the clerk of the trial court issued a writ of garnishment after
respondent posted bond and filed an affidavit stating the amount
of the debt and asserting the belief that the debt would not be
collected without the garnishment.' Defendant filed a motion to
1. The amount of the debt in controversy was $51,279.17. The writ of garnishment was
served on the First National Bank of Dalton, Georgia, as garnishee, on the same day that
plaintiff filed its complaint and defendant was served with process.
2. The relevant portion of GA. CODE ANN. § 46-101 (1974) provides:
Right to writ; wages exempt until after judgment In cases where suit shall be pending,
or where judgment shall have been obtained, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the process
of garnishment. . . [p]rovided, further, that nothing in this section shall be construed
as abridging the right of garnishment in attachment before judgment is obtained.
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1974) provides in part:
Affidavit; necessity and contents. Bond The plaintiff, his agent, or attorney at law shall
make affidavit before some officer authorized to issue an attachment, or the clerk of any
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dismiss the writ,4 contending that the garnishment statute violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 5 because it
deprived defendant of its property without notice or opportunity for
a hearing. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the Su-
preme Court of Georgia affirmed.' On certiorari, the Supreme Court
of the United States held, reversed and remanded. In the absence
of prior notice and a hearing, the Georgia statute permitting the
issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment based on an affidavit
containing only conclusory allegations and which does not require
judicial supervision of the garnishment process or a prompt post-
garnishment hearing violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
II. BACKGROUND
An extensive body of law has developed over the past half cen-
tury setting forth in practical terms the meaning of "due process of
law." In an early pronouncement, the Supreme Court said that no
property may be taken from an individual without notice and an
opportunity to be heard.' While this point is well settled,8 the Court
court of record in which the said garnishment is being filed or in which the main case is
filed, stating the amount claimed to be due in such action, or on such judgment, and
that he has reason to apprehend the loss of the same or some part thereof unless process
of garnishment shall issue, and shall give bond, with good security, in a sum at least
equal to double the amount sworn to be due, payable to the defendant in the suit or
judgment, as the case may be, conditioned to pay said defendant all costs and damages
that he may sustain in consequence of suing out said garnishment, in the event that the
plaintiff shall fail to recover in the suit, or it shall appear that the amount sworn to be
due on such judgment was not due, or that the property or money sought to be garnished
was not subject to process of garnishment.
4. Three days after issuance of the writ of garnishment defendant filed a bond with the
court clerk, discharging the garnishee and dissolving the garnishment in accordance with GA.
CODE ANN. § 46-401 (1974) which provides in part:
Dissolution of garnishment; bond; judgment on bond When garnishment shall have been
issued, the defendant may dissolve such garnishment upon filing in the clerk's office of
the court . . . where suit is pending or judgment was obtained, a bond with good
security, payable to the plaintiff conditioned for the payment of any judgment that shall
be rendered on said garnishment.
Therefore, petitioner's motion to dismiss the writ was directed toward the discharge of its
bond since the bank account was no longer frozen by the writ.
5. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[NIor shall any State deprive any person
of. . . property, without due procese of law. .. .
6. 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E.2d 321 (1973). Subsequent to the Georgia Supreme Court's
decision, a three-judge federal court declared the same statutory provisions unconstitutional.
Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
7. "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice requires that no man
shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his
defence [sic]." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
8. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Coe v.
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has applied a flexible standard in determining what form the hear-
ing must take,' requiring only that a hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case'" be given "at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner."" The Court traditionally has balanced the interests
of the government in summary decision-making against the inter-
ests of the property owner in retaining the use and possession of his
property,' 2 with the result that a hearing prior to initial taking is not
imperative if the opportunity for ultimate judicial determination
adequately protects the interests of the individual.'3 Using this bal-
ancing test, the Court has found prehearing deprivation of property
constitutional in the seizure of assets of a financially troubled sav-
ings bank,' 4 seizure of misbranded drugs'5 and contaminated food,' 6
collection of taxes owed the federal government, '" seizure in aid of
the national war effort,' 8 and discharge of an employee incident to
the operation of a military installation.'9
One of the most troublesome areas for the Court in applying
procedural due process standards has been that of prehearing sei-
zure of property by use of the provisional credit remedies of attach-
ment,'2 garnishment,2' and replevin.2 The practice of seizing and
disposing of a person's assets through one of these devices has been
Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914);
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876).
9. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951).
10. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
11. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
12. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Ewing v. Metin-
ger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
13. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
14. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
15. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
16. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
17. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 583 (1931).
18. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547
(1921).
19. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
20. "'Attachment' is a provisional, auxiliary remedy, created by statute, whereby a
creditor can obtain a contingent lien on property of the debtor, and thus have this property
kept available to satisfy any judgment which he may recover against the debtor .. H.
OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 30 (1953).
21. Garnishment is a form of attachment used to reach the assets of the debtor when
they are in the hands of a third-party, to whom the order is directed. Id. at 31. For a
comparison of attachment and garnishment, see Comment, 22 VAD L. Rxv. 1400, 1401-02
(1969).
22. Replevin is a remedy permitting a seller of goods to take immediate possession of
the goods when the purchaser has allegedly defaulted on a conditional sales contract. Com-
ment, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 886, 887 (1971). For a historical background, see J. COBBEY, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN (1890).
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common in America since the colonial period. 3 Garnishment, and
the closely associated writ of attachment, were derived from the
medieval remedy of "foreign attachment" that enabled the creditor
to gain jurisdiction over a nonresident debtor by attaching his assets
found in the hands of third persons.24 In America, no distinction was
made between the resident and nonresident debtor so that the
procedure originally designed as a device to obtain jurisdiction be-
came a provisional credit remedy.2 A due process challenge to at-
tachment first confronted the Supreme Court in Ownbey v.
Morgan,21 in which the Court upheld attachment of the property of
a nonresident debtor because the procedure promoted the state pur-
pose of obtaining jurisdiction of state courts over nonresidents. In
Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett,7 the Court upheld summary sei-
zure of defendant's assets to satisfy his liability to depositors of an
insolvent bank of which he was a stockholder. Both Ownbey and
Coffin Brothers involved strong state interests-jurisdictional vital-
ity of state courts and protection of bank deposits-but, in McKay
v. McInnes,28 the Court was faced with a direct challenge to
prehearing seizure, the only state interest being that of aiding credi-
tors in the collection of debts. The Court upheld the statute, citing
Ownbey and Coffin Brothers as controlling.
A due process challenge to provisional collection remedies did
not come before the Supreme Court again until it decided Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.21 some forty years later." In Sniadach, the
Court invalidated a wage garnishment statute that failed to provide
notice and a hearing prior to the taking of the debtor's wages. The
Court recognized that mere use of property is a property interest
23. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104.05 (1921); Mussman & Riesenfield,
Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Muss-
man].
24. Mussman, supra note 23, at 8.
25. Mussman, supra note 23, at 10-11.
26. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
27. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
28. 279 U.S. 820 (1929), aff'g per curiam McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699
(1928).
29. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30. The question was raised on several occasions in lower courts, with the result that
the collection device was routinely upheld. See, c.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Milne, 127 Vt. 249, 246
A.2d 837 (1968); Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932). The constitutional
objection was rebutted by a variety of reasons: interest of the creditor outweighed the interest
of the debtor; the taking was only temporary in nature and therefore no hearing was required
until final deprivation; creditor was seen as having an equal interest in the property; no state
action, and the entrenched, traditional nature of the remedies. Note, Procedural Due
Process-The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 41,
44 (1973).
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worthy of constitutional protection so that even temporary depriva-
tion without a hearing violated due process requirements. The Court
also seemed to depart from the traditional balancing test,3" estab-
lishing the presumption that a hearing is required absent extraordi-
nary circumstances. 32 In the wake of Sniadach, courts and commen-
tators were uncertain whether the Sniadach approach would be con-
fined to wages and other "necessities of life, '33 what circumstances
were extraordinary enough to permit seizure, 34 and what form the
required prior hearing must take .3 Although Supreme Court cases
subsequent to Sniadach seemed to extend its approach to other
forms of property, the interest at stake in each case was arguably
analogous to the sensitive individual interest embodied in wages.36
Further confusing the situation, the Court used both "balancing of
interests" language and "extraordinary circumstances" language in
juxtaposition. 3  Faced with the conflicting interpretations, the
Court in Fuentes v. Shevin,5 a 4-3 decision, invalidated the Florida
and Pennsylvania replevin statutes, holding that an individual
must be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of
any significant property right except in extraordinary situations
31. See Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment is a Denial of Due Process: The
Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68 MiCH. L. Rav. 986, 994-
98 (1970).
32. 395 U.S. at 339.
33. Compare Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (repossession of motor
vehicles invalid); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp 716 (N.D. N.Y. 1970)
(procedure for repossession of household furnishings invalid); Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5
Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (statute allowing attachment of a bank
account held unconstitutional) with Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.
1970) (replevin of bowling alley equipment upheld); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F.
Supp. 1011, 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (wage garnishment portion of general garnishment statute
invalidated without disturbing any other provisions); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp.
645 (D. Md. 1971) (replevin of personal property upheld).
34. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term 83 H~Av. L. REV. 7, 115-16 (1969).
35. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 358 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 Hav. L.
REv. 7, 115 (1969).
36. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (dismissal of tenured teacher); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(revocation of driver's license of one whose job depended on ability to travel); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits).
37. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court discussed the weight of the state's
interest in protecting an injured claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment
from an uninsured motorist relative to the weight of the individual's interest in avoiding
suspension of a driver's license. 402 U.S. at 540. But later in the opinion, the Court asserted,
"[Ilt is fundamental that except in emergency situations. . . due process requires that when
a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes
effective." 402 U.S. at 542 (emphasis by the court).
38. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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involving compelling governmental interests. The statutes in ques-
tion required as prerequisites to issuance of the writ that an affida-
vit alleging wrongful detention be submitted to the court clerk, that
a damage bond be filed, and that opportunity for a hearing be given
at the trial of the main cause of action. 9 Fuentes eliminated any
distinction between kinds of property deserving special treatment,
thus extending Sniadach beyond "necessities of life."40 Also in ac-
cord with Sniadach, the Court ruled that even a temporary depriva-
tion of property required a prior hearing, thus expressly rejecting the
post-seizure hearing and creditor's damage bond as curative mea-
sures." The Court also attempted to resolve the question of what
elements are necessary to bring a seizure within the special circum-
stances exception to the prior hearing rule, indicating that an im-
portant governmental or general public interest must be at stake,
special need for prompt action must be present, and the procedure
must be under the strict control of proper governmental officials
acting under narrowly drawn statutes specifying when summary
action is necessary and justified.42 The Court expressly excluded
state intervention to aid private debt collection from the extraordi-
nary circumstance classification.43 Fuentes subsequently became
the leading case for a new, strictly applied standard of prior notice
and hearing4 and provided the impetus for invalidation of a wide
range of creditor collection devices.4 5
39. 407 U.S. at 73-78. The Pennsylvania statute did not require any hearing unless
initiated by the debtor himself.
40. 407 U.S. at 90.
41. 407 U.S. at 85-86.
42. The Court found the three prerequisites present in past cases in which summary
seizure was upheld "to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs
of a national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to
protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food." 407 U.S. at 91-92. There-
fore, the Court explained the early due process cases which had upheld summary seizure on
the basis of a balancing test as extraordinary situations obviating the necessity of prior notice
and hearing. See notes 13-19 supra and accompanying text. The Court, however, was careful
to exclude McKay v. McInnes from this group of cases, explaining that it "cannot stand for
any more than was established in the Coffin Bros. and Ownbey cases on which it relied
completely." 407 U.S. at 91 n.23; see notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
43. 407 U.S. at 93. The Court hedged its position by sanctioning the use of attachment
to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction of the debtor, clearly an instance of state intervention to
aid private gain, finding justification in the necessity to secure jurisdiction of state courts.
407 U.S. at 91 n. 23. But cf. Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements,
82 YALE L.J. 1023 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), in which a
three-judge court expressed regret in declaring the Tennessee replevin statute unconstitu-
tional, but indicated that the statute could not stand in the face of the rigid standard set
forth in Fuentes.
45. See, e.g., Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973)
(garagemen's lien); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (landlord's lien); Gunter v.
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In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co." the Supreme Court halted the
evolution of the Sniadach-Fuentes approach to due process by up-
holding a Louisiana sequestration 7 statute which, like the Fuentes
statutes, allowed the repossession of goods without prior notice and
an opportunity for a hearing." Justice White, writing for the major-
ity,4" noted that the Louisiana statute was more narrowly drawn,
containing certain safeguards designed to protect the debtor's inter-
ests: the writ was issued only if the debtor might conceal, waste, or
dispose of the property; the issuance was conditioned on the filing
of a factual rather than conclusory affidavit; the process was subject
to control by a judicial officer rather than a court clerk; and the
debtor was given an immediate dissolution hearing in which the
creditor was required to present proof supporting his allegations."
Regardless of these distinguishing characteristics, if the Court had
strictly applied the test set forth in Fuentes the statute would have
been unconstitutional since no prior opportunity for a hearing was
given and the state's interest in private repossession was not a spe-
cial circumstance recognized by Fuentes." The language in Mitchell
seemed to indicate the Court's intent to return to the early due
process approach, balancing the state's interest in orderly function-
ing of commerce against the individual's interest in uninterrupted
possession and use of the property,12 leading five members of the
Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (attachment of real prop-
erty); Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972) (utility shut-offs). See
also Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution,
59 VA. L. Ray. 355 (1973). After Fuentes, the remedy of prejudgment replevin seemed dead
except in three situations. First, the repossession remedy conceivably could have fit the
"extraordinary situation" analysis. Secondly, the remedy of self-help under section 9-503 of
the Uniform Commercial Code might have been available. For cases upholding section 9-503
on grounds that self-help involves no state action, see Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc.,
496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974). Thirdly, although Fuentes expressly condemned waiver
clauses and cognovit notes in the consumer credit setting, 407 U.S. at 96, the remedies were
still available in a general commercial context when the parties entering the agreement were
of equal bargaining power. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v.
Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
46. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
47. Sequestration is the civil law equivalent of replevin.
48. According to the dissent, the statutes were "remarkably similar." 416 U.S. at 629.
49. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion.
50. 416 U.S. at 605-06.
51. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 11 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
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Court,53 lower court judges,54 and commentators55 to conclude that
Fuentes had been overruled to the extent that it required notice and
an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure." In addition to the
question whether Fuentes had lost all its vitality or was merely
distinguished by the Court, the Mitchell decision raised other ques-
tions. The Court seemed to indicate that hearing and notice could
be by-passed prior to seizure if certain statutory safeguards were
present, but it failed to clarify completely what those safeguards
must be. Additionally, because Sniadach was left undisturbed by
the Court, the question arose whether the Court intended to distin-
guish certain property as "necessities of life," thus requiring appli-
cation of a different due process standard.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In determining whether the challenged statute met the proce-
dural requirements of the fourteenth amendment, the instant
Court 7 looked to the statutory safeguards protecting the debtor's
property interest in the absence of prior notice and hearing. Com-
paring the instant statute to the Fuentes statutes, the Court as-
serted that the same constitutional infirmities were present. Each
statute allowed the seizure of property without prior notice and
opportunity for a hearing by the issuance of a writ by a court clerk
after the filing of an affidavit containing conclusory allegations. The
instant Court restated its belief set forth in Sniadach and Fuentes
that even a temporary deprivation of property does not put the
seizure beyond scrutiny under due process requirements. The Court
53. Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall agreed in one dissent that Fuentes had
been overruled. 416 U.S. at 634. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissent, agreed that Fuentes
required reversal of Mitchell. 416 U.S. at 636. Justice Powell in an opinion concurring with
the majority also said Fuentes was overruled. 416 U.S. at 623.
54. Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (three-judge court). But
see Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364, 1365 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (indicating that Fuentes
may be applicable if the challenged statute is substantially similar to the statutes in
Fuentes).
55. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAy. L. REv. 41, 71-72 (1974); Note, Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant-The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MEMmS ST. L. REv. 74, 87 (1974).
56. A distinguishing feature of Mitchell is that Louisiana law provides that a vendor-
creditor loses his security interest in the property when the debtor alienates the property. In
all other states the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect and protects the perfected security
interest against the interests of third-party purchasers. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-201;
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-
2, at 901 (1972). Although individuals buying consumer goods for their own use take free of
any security interest of the seller, the seller can protect himself by the prior filing of a
financing statement. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(2); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
§ 25-14, at 943-44. Therefore, the Louisiana situation may have been peculiar enough in the
eyes of the Court to merit special treatment, but the Court did not indicate that it subscribed
to this approach apparently viewing it as only one factor of many that must be considered.
57. Justice White wrote the majority opinion as he did in Mitchell. He was joined in




then asserted that the Georgia statute had none of the saving char-
acteristics of the Louisiana sequestration statute upheld in
Mitchell. According to the Court, the Mitchell statute survived
challenge because of the presence of safeguards which imposed judi-
cial control over the process of issuance of the writ; required the
creditor's affidavit to contain factual allegations; and provided for
an immediate post-seizure hearing at which the debtor could seek
dissolution of the writ. The Court also pointed out that it would not
distinguish kinds of property requiring special protection, subject-
ing garnishment of a bank account in a commercial setting involving
two corporations of equal bargaining power to the same standard
applied to individual property in a consumer setting. Since the
Georgia statute did not require prior notice and hearing and failed
to properly accommodate the interests of the debtor by other safe-
guards, the Court held the statute to be in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 58
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun" argued that the
Court's decision could not be supported by Sniadach or Fuentes and
that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Mitchell stan-
dard. Asserting that Sniadach was applicable only to wages, he said
that it should not be expanded to arms-length transactions between
financially sound corporations. Citing the dissent and the Powell
concurrence in Mitchell, he contended that the Fuentes decision
had been overruled and thus should have no application in the
instant case. Blackmun bolstered his argument by contending that
Fuentes had been a weak precedent from its inception because it
was the decision of a 4-3 majority. Turning to the Mitchell balanc-
ing test, the dissent found sufficient statutory safeguards in the
requirement that suit be filed before process issues, thus insuring an
ultimate hearing; that double bond be posted to cover damages; and
that the creditor file an affidavit of apprehension of loss. The dissent
cast aside the clerk-judge distinction as being of little significance,
and found that, in a commercial setting, the interests of the debtor
were properly protected so that the failure to give prior notice and
hearing did not violate the due process clause."
58. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion in which he reasserted his belief, set forth
in Mitchell, that Fuentes had been overruled. He applied the balancing test of Mitchell and
found the Georgia statute unconstitutional primarily because of the failure of the statute to
provide a prompt dissolution hearing. He said that presence of a judicial officer should not
be a prerequisite to constitutionality.
59. Justice Blackmun was joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger
filed a separate dissent in which he concurred with Blackmun that Sniadach should not be
applied in a commercial context between corporations and that the clerk-judge distinction is
of little significance.
60. The dissenting judges also expressed regret at what they believed to be a movement





The instant decision resolves some of the confusion engendered
by Mitchell but leaves other questions unanswered. In direct con-
trast to Fuentes, Mitchell indicated that some property interests,
"necessities of life," are more substantial than others and deserve
special protection." The instant Court resolved the issue in favor of
the Fuentes approach, 2 stating that once a property interest is
found, the Court will not engage its own subjective viewpoint to
determine the relative importance of the interest. 3 In the instant
case, the Court was presented with a factual situation in which the
property interest at stake could have been distinguished easily from
those interests involved in Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell. The
deprivation occasioned by seizure of the debtor corporation's bank
account produced slight possibility of human suffering and seemed
to produce very little inconvenience since the writ was dissolved
within three days by posting a bond, 4 a transaction "of a day-to-
day type in the commercial world." 5 The refusal of the Court to
make the distinction in this particular case, in which the interest
was clearly not vital or necessary to human life and in which such
a distinction might not have produced a grossly unreasonable result,
seems to indicate a firm commitment by the members of the major-
ity to a single standard of review applicable to all property inter-
ests." By returning to the Fuentes rationale, the Court promotes a
workable rule which avoids reliance on each judge's subjective opin-
ion of what property interests are important enough to be classified
as "necessities of life," thus promoting certainty and uniformity in
subsequent decisions.
A second question seemingly answered by the instant Court,
despite some confusing language," is the extent to which Fuentes
61. 416 U.S. at 614.
62. 407 U.S. at 89-90.
63. 95 S. Ct. at 723.
64. See note 3 supra.
65. 95 S. Ct. at 729 (dissenting opinion).
66. The Court, however, has been willing to differentiate between property interests in
the case of cognovit notes and waiver clauses in which the debtor waives his right to a hearing
when the note is made. In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Court
upheld waiver clauses in an arm's-length transaction between corporations of equal bargain-
ing power. But in Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), the Court invalidated a confession
of judgment clause in a consumer credit transaction, noting the possible presence of adhesion
contracts and overreaching by creditors. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972).
67. The majority opinion in Di-Chem cited Fuentes with approval, but all the members
of the majority except Justice White had said in Mitchell that Fuentes had been overruled.
See note 54 supra. The Mitchell majority distinguished Fuentes but two of the same justices
writing in Di-Chem said Mitchell had overruled it. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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retains its precedential value. Although the Court relied on the
factual and statutory setting of Fuentes, the test of constitutionality
applied in the instant case was not the same rigid standard set forth
by the Fuentes Court. Fuentes held that due process requires "that
an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordi-
nary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake
that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."68 Justice
White, writing for the Di-Chem Court, stated that the statute in
Fuentes and the instant statute were unconstitutional "because the
official seizures had been carried out without notice and without
opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repos-
session."69 Justice White's standard is weaker than the presumption
established by Fuentes and is designed to achieve an accommoda-
tion of interests in the vein of early due process and the standard
set forth by Justice White in Mitchell. Therefore, it appears that
Fuentes has been overruled to the extent that it required notice and
a hearing prior to deprivation of a property interest. 0 Conceptually,
the balancing test which has replaced Fuentes goes one step further
toward allowing summary seizure than the pre-Sniadach balancing
test. The early due process cases involved an accommodation of
private property interests vis-A-vis the public welfare,7 but the test
evolving from Mitchell and Di-Chem equates the creditor's interest
in debt collection with the public welfare for purposes of the balanc-
ing analysis.7 2 The result may be an undesirable extension of the
pre-Sniadach rationale, particularly in light of the fact that creditor
collection devices do little to promote public welfare when abused
by creditors as instruments of oppression.73 In a practical sense, the
shift to a balancing test means that counsel for an individual who
has been deprived of a property interest by summary seizure can no
68. 407 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
69. 95 S. Ct. at 722 (emphasis added).
70. For cases reaching the same conclusion on the basis of the Mitchell decision see
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974) (dicta); Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp.
432 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
71. See notes 13-19 supra and accompanying text.
72. It may be argued that Mitchell is a peculiar situation requiring zealous protection
of creditor interests due to the absence of the statutory protection afforded by the Uniform
Commercial Code in other states. See note 56 supra. At least two lower courts, however, have
relied on Mitchell to uphold replevin statutes in states where the UCC is in effect, protecting
the secured creditor against destruction of his security interest through alienation by the
debtor. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974); Woods v. Tennes-
see, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
73. See Patterson, Forward: Wage Garnishment an Extraordinary Remedy Run




longer unequivocally assert that due process mandates opportunity
for a prior hearing. He must look to the facts of his client's case and
direct the court to those aspects of the taking which appear to be
most inequitable. In an example of this type approach, Arnett v.
Kennedy,74 the Court upheld the discharge of a nonprobationary
employee although no opportunity for prior hearing was given. At
least three judges found a constitutional entitlement7" but stated
that due process is satisfied if the hearing occurs after suspension
but before final termination. The Court, in an opinion handed down
the same week as Di-Chem, referred to extraordinary circum-
stances, but allowed the ex parte seizure of a yacht to stand even
though the owner did not know of the seizure until the statutory
period for contest had passed .7 In both cases the Court evidenced a
perceptible movement away from the rigidity of Fuentes to a flexi-
ble position allowing accommodation of all interests concerned.
After establishing a flexible balancing standard, the instant
Court failed to explore fully the effectiveness of the safeguards set
forth and to resolve completely what safeguards are necessary when
a prior hearing is not given. The effectiveness of judicial scrutiny
has been questioned by one commentator, 7  who observed that judi-
cial supervision in Louisiana under the Mitchell statute appears to
be purely ministerial once the affidavit is filed, indicating that the
supervision is actually an undemanding check on potential abuses
of the debtor's rights. One way effectively to implement judicial
scrutiny would be to require the same type showing necessary to
secure a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,7 but
the sheer volume of cases would pose formidable practical problems.
Factual affidavits may serve to deter the filing of fraudulent or
spurious affidavits, but the deterrence is lost if the affiant is not
promptly put to his proof. Properly administered, the post-seizure
hearing may be the most effective device to prevent injustice, but
the danger lies in its undue postponement. As an illustration of the
possible illusory nature of the protection, the dissent in the instant
74. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
75. Three judges found a statutorily based entitlement and held that retention of the
entitlement was conditioned upon the statutory procedures for withdrawing the grant. See
The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 55, at 83.
76. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The Court's
holding may be explained by the need to assert in rem jurisdiction over the property in order
to conduct forfeiture proceedings.
77. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 55, at 79-80.
78. See Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(court compares the statutory scheme in Mitchell to the procedure in federal court for issu-
ance of an ex parte restraining order).
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case was willing to let the trial on the merits suffice as a post-seizure
hearing,79 even though the trial might not occur for several months.
This kind of delay flies in the face of the Court's assertion that use
and possession of property is itself a property interest worthy of
protection. From a reading of the instant opinion it is impossible to
determine the relative importance of the factors to the Court. The
lower court cases following Mitchell exhibit varying interpretations
of the weighting of safeguards. The Tennessee replevin statute was
upheld despite the fact that the statute makes no provision for an
immediate post-seizure hearing." The North Dakota replevin stat-
ute was allowed to stand even though it contains no provision for
judicial supervision.' In both cases the courts found that the pres-
ence of other safeguards compensated for the omissions. The lower
courts in reaching their decisions to uphold or invalidate a statute
under Mitchell usually have employed the same approach as the
instant Court, comparing the challenged statute to the Fuentes stat-
utes and to the Mitchell statute.12 The effect is to establish a contin-
uum with Mitchell and Fuentes at either end and the challenged
statute in the middle. Whether the presiding court sees the statute
as falling closer to Fuentes or closer to Mitchell will probably de-
pend on each judge's subjective feeling about the use of creditor
remedies in general and the specific factual situations before the
court. The instant opinion does little to remedy this state of affairs.
The Court's movement to a flexible standard is more in keeping
with traditional practice and provides an analytical device for con-
sidering and accommodating both creditor and debtor interests, but
the Court's failure fully to formulate meaningful safeguards and to
elaborate on their interaction contributes to confusion and subjec-
tivity. In Morrissey v. Brewer83 the Court set forth the minimum
standards acceptable before parole could be revoked. A similar ef-
fort should be made in the area of creditors' remedies so that flexi-
bility can be achieved without promoting uncertainty and subjec-
tive decision-making.
KEITH B. SIMMONS
79. 95 S. Ct. at 729.
80. Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
81. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974).
82. See Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich 1974);
Manning v. Palmer, 381 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254
(S.D. Tex. 1974):




in Accumulated Earnings and Profits in a Taxable
Year Because of Redemptions of Stock from Tax-
Exempt Charities does not Preclude Imposition of
the Accumulated Earnings Tax
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1959 the president and sole shareholder of taxpayer corpora-
tion began a practice of contributing his taxpayer stock to certain
tax-exempt charities and taking corresponding charitable deduc-
tions.' Taxpayer had substantial income in each subsequent year2
and on several occasions redeemed portions of the donated stock
although it never compensated its president for his services and paid
only two relatively small cash dividends. 3 In 1968 taxpayer re-
deemed the last of its stock held by the charities, causing a decrease
for the year in its accumulated earnings and profits despite substan-
tial taxable income.4 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue as-
sessed accumulated earnings tax deficiencies for 1967 and 1968, 5
contending that in both years taxpayer had been availed of for the
purpose of avoiding income tax with respect to its principal share-
holder by permitting its earnings and profits to accumulate instead
of being divided or distributed within the meaning of section 532(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code.6 Challenging these deficiencies, tax-
1. Taxpayer is a closely held corporation incorporated in 1954 under the laws of Michi-
gan. Its business is selling and distributing automobile parts in Michigan and Ohio. Tax-
payer's president, Emmet E. Tracy, and his wife, between 1959 and 1967, donated 7,190
shares of stock in taxpayer to 4 charities, Catholic Foreign Mission, St. Mary's Church, Jesuit
Seminary Guild, and Guest House, taking charitable deductions totalling $728,325.
2. Taxpayer's income ranged from $159,879 ($82,343 after taxes) in 1959 to $596,609
($278,783 after taxes) in 1968.
3. Taxpayer paid cash dividends of $46,300 in 1967 and $67,440 in 1968. In addition, in
December 1968, taxpayer's board of directors voted Tracy, then sole shareholder, a stock
dividend of 5000 shares of recently authorized one-dollar par 7-dollar cumulative preferred
stock.
4. Taxpayer in 1968 expended $434,460 to redeem 1820 shares of its stock. Of this
expenditure $1,820 was chargeable to capital account, and $432,640 to earnings and profits.
Had these funds been retained, taxpayer's accumulated earnings and profits would have
increased in 1968 from $1,582,390.05 to $1,793,739.08.
5. Pursuant to § 534(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Commissioner noti-
fied taxpayer on November 10, 1970, of proposed deficiencies for 1967 and 1968. Taxpayer
did not file a responding statement to challenge the proposed deficiencies, as permitted by §
534(c). On April 14, 1971, a notice of deficiency was mailed to taxpayer assessing deficiencies
of $79,419.93 and $84,593.87 for 1967 and 1968, respectively.
6. The accumulated earnings tax applies to every corporation, with certain exceptions,
formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders
or the shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate
instead of being divided or distributed. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 532(a).
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payer maintained that the decrease in its accumulated earnings and
profits in 1968 took it outside the meaning of section 532(a) and
therefore made the accumulated earnings tax inapplicable in that
year. Though finding taxpayer liable for 1967, the United States
Tax Court accepted taxpayer's contention for 1968 and expunged
the second deficiency. 7 On appeal by the Commissioner to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held,
reversed and remanded for further findings of fact. A decrease in
accumulated earnings and profits in a taxable year because of re-
demptions of stock from tax-exempt charities does not preclude a
finding that a corporation was availed of in that year for the purpose
of avoiding income tax with respect to its shareholders by permit-
ting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed within the meaning of section 532(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code. GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
75-348 (6th Cir. 1974).
H1. BACKGROUND
The accumulated earnings tax originated in the Tariff Act of
1913,8 which required shareholders to include in taxable income
their entire distributive share of the gains and profits of all corpora-
tions formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of avoiding
additional income tax through the medium of permitting these
gains and profits to accumulate rather than being divided or distrib-
uted. Doubting the constitutionality of requiring partnership treat-
ment of shareholders,9 Congress in 1921 substituted an income sur-
tax on these corporations that contained an option under which
shareholders might exempt a corporation by electing to have all its
net income taxed to them.'" The Revenue Act of 1934 for the first
time allowed corporations to deduct from their income, for purposes
of the penalty tax, amounts actually paid out in dividends to share-
holders, while retaining the shareholders' election to report the cor-
poration's entire net income pro rata as their own." The 1938 Act
revised the shareholder election provision into a consent dividend
procedure allowing shareholders to report amounts as dividends,
7. GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 480 (1973).
8. Tariff Act of 1913, § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 166.
9. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16-17 (1921). The source of these doubts was the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
10. Revenue Act of 1921, § 220, 42 Stat. 247. The shareholder election was eliminated
in 1924, but reinstated in 1926. Revenue Act of 1924, § 220, 43 Stat. 277; Revenue Act of 1926,
§ 220(e), 44 Stat. 34.
11. Revenue Act of 1934, § 102, 48 Stat. 702.
[Vol. 28
RECENT CASES
which would increase the dividends-paid deduction to the extent
amounts were reported pro rata, without requiring actual pay-
ment.'2 The present Internal Revenue Code essentially retains the
1938 provisions by imposing in each taxable year an additional tax
on the accumulated taxable income of every corporation "formed or
availed of for the purpose of avoiding income tax with respect to its
shareholders. . . by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate
instead of being divided or distributed,"'" and by reducing accumu-
lated taxable income for all nonpreferential dividends and distribu-
tions, including consent dividends.'4
Thus, the basic operative phrase "formed or availed of for the
purpose of avoiding income tax by permitting earnings and profits
to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed" has not been
changed significantly since the first federal income tax statute fol-
lowing the passage of the sixteenth amendment. Neither the statu-
tory provisions nor the congressional reports have indicated ex-
pressly whether application of the tax requires accumulation within
the taxable year."5 Enactment of the 1928 House Bill, which substi-
tuted the phrase "to remain accumulated," might have resolved
this question, but the Senate reverted to the previous wording which
was reenacted."6 Congress has used the phrase "earnings and profits
for the taxable year" in defining the accumulated earnings credit, 17
and the accompanying Senate Report indicates that prior accumu-
lations must be considered in determining whether a corporation
needed to retain its current earnings," but the basic operative
phrase has remained unaltered in this respect. Further complica-
tions result from the use of "accumulated taxable income" as a
measure for the tax, in contrast to the use of "earnings and profits"
in the operative phrase, which determines the application of the tax.
12. Revenue Act of 1938, §§ 27(b)(1), 28(c), 102(d)(2), 52 Stat. 468, 471, 483.
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531, 532.
14. When applicable, the tax is levied by § 531 at the rate of 27.5% of the first $100,000
of "accumulated taxable income" and at the rate of 38.5% of any "accumulated taxable
income" above $100,000. The term "accumulated taxable income," defined in § 535 means
the corporation's taxable income for the year in question (with certain adjustments), minus
the sum of the dividends-paid deduction and the "accumulated earnings credit." The deduc-
tion for dividends paid is allowed in § 561. Section 562(c) disqualifies disproportionate distri-
butions, and § 565 provides the consent dividend procedure.
15. See generally J. SmDmAN, LFGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws 1938-
1861 (1938).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 2,70th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 18 (1928); S. REP. No. 960,70th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12, 25 (1928); Revenue Act of 1928, § 104(a), 45 Stat. 814.
17. "[T]he accumulated earnings credit is (A) an amount equal to such part of the
earnings and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the
business . . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 535(c)(1).
18. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 317 (1954).
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The Code does not comprehensively define "earnings and profits,"
although it does use the concept for a variety of purposes, especially
in determining the tax effect upon shareholders of corporate distri-
butions.19 Because a disproportionate distribution in redemption of
stock is chargeable against earnings and profits0 but does not re-
duce "accumulated taxable income," the measure of the penalty tax
may be high while the accumulated earnings have not increased at
all during the year under scrutiny. With these complications inher-
ent in the statutory scheme, courts have inevitably been called upon
to determine the conditions necessary for application of the accu-
mulated earnings tax in a particular year.
Although no court has explicitly decided the issue, some courts
have indicated that a corporation "formed" for the proscribed pur-
pose of avoiding income tax with respect to its shareholders is liable
for the accumulated earnings tax in every subsequent year.21 On the
other hand, some courts have held, without discussion, that a judg-
ment that a corporation was "availed of" in one year does not bar,
either by estoppel or res judicata, a challenge to an assessment for
a later year. 22 Thus if the corporation was not formed for tax avoid-
ance purposes, liability for the penalty tax in a particular year de-
pends on whether it was availed of for the proscribed purpose in that
year. Some cases lend support to the proposition that neither suc-
cessful tax avoidance 23 nor an accumulation in excess of the needs
of the business 24 is necessary to imposition of the tax. Nonetheless,
W. S. Farish & Co. v. Commissioner,25 which involved a corporation
19. The following Code provisions involve earnings and profits: § 333 (one-month liqui-
dations); § 1371 (Subchapter S corporations); § 951 (controlled foreign corporations); § 902
(deemed-paid foreign tax credit); and § 1248 (stock of a controlled foreign corporation). See
B. BITrKER & J. EusTIcnE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
7.03 (abr. stud. ed. 1971).
20. See B. BrrrKER & J. EusIcE, supra note 19, 9.65; Herwitz, Stock Redemptions
and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARv. L. REv. 866, 932 nn.171 & 172 (1961).
21. A.D. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 23, 24 (5th Cir. 1936), aff'g 33 B.T.A.
135 (1935) (formed and availed of); Rands, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1094, 1097 (1936)
(formed and availed of).
22. World Publishing Co. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Okla. 1952);
United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 83, 87-88 (1935) (tax imposed,
nevertheless; taxpayer availed of in year in question).
23. A.D. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 23, 24 (5th Cir. 1936), aff'g 33 B.T.A.
135 (1935). See Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, 49 YALE L.J. 171, 184 (1939).
24. United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 635 (1933), aff'g 19 B.T.A. 809, 828 (1930); Pelton Steel Casting Co. v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 153, 173 (1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
958 (1958); Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 346, 374 (1942), af'd, 137 F.2d
424 (2d Cir. 1943); see Rudick, supra note 23, at 184.
25. 38 B.T.A. 150 (1938).
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formed in 1929 to avoid tax by registering losses, established that a
purpose to avoid tax by some means that does not involve accumu-
lation is not sufficient for liability.26 The Commissioner, having lost
on this initial issue in Farish, also contended that the company had
recouped all its losses of earlier years and that it had been "availed
of" in 1934 by permitting its gains and profits to accumulate. Dis-
agreeing with the Commissioner's calculation, the Board of Tax
Appeals held that the company still had a cumulative operating
deficit instead of distributable gains and profits. The Board went
on to state that, in this situation, the company could not have been
availed of for the prohibited purpose, although the Commissioner
weakened the precedential value of the Board's statement by sub-
stantially conceding this point. The Board further found that the
company had insufficient funds for its business, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit in affirming apparently relied on this finding. 7
The Board next commented on the meaning of "availed of" in
Corporate Investment Co. v. Commissioner,2 in which the Commis-
sioner again contended that a corporation was liable in one year
because it had been "availed of" in prior years. In rejecting this
argument, the Board stated that Congress intended to apply the tax
to a corporation "availed of" within the taxable year by permitting
gains and profits of that year to accumulate, but did not intend to
tax a corporation because it had been "availed of" in other years or
because it did not distribute a surplus accumulated in prior years.
The Board based its reasoning on the principles of annual account-
ing, the use in the statute of the words "to accumulate" instead of
"to remain accumulated, '29 the use of current income to measure
the tax, and the exemption from the tax of any corporation whose
current earnings were distributed to or reported by its shareholders.
The Board ultimately exonerated the corporation because, although
current gains were present, the proscribed purpose of avoiding taxa-
tion was absent.
Finally in American Metal Products Corp. v. Commissioner,3
a court considered a corporation with both accumulated taxable
income and accumulated earnings and profits, but no increase in
accumulated earnings during the taxable year. Relying on state-
ments in Farish and Corporate Investment Co. indicating that each
26. See Rudick, supra note 23, at 188-89.
27. 104 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1939).
28. 40 B.T.A. 1156 (1939).
29. The Board referred to the legislative history of the 1928 Act. See note 16 supra and
accompanying text.
30. 34 T.C. 89 (1960), afj'd sub nom. Adler Metal Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 287
F.2d 860 (8th Cir. 1961) (appeal by taxpayer concerning 1952 and 1954).
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year must be considered separately and that the proscribed act is
the accumulation of "gains and profits," not "taxable net income,"
the Tax Court held, on its own motion, that the accumulated earn-
ings tax did not apply to the taxpayer corporation in 1953 because
its earned surplus declined in that year.-' A similar situation arose
in Ostendorf-Morris Co. v. United States,32 in which a preferential
stock redemption had wiped out the company's current earnings but
not its accumulated taxable income. Focusing on the pro rata re-
quirement of the dividends-paid deduction, the district court
stressed that because Congress did not allow a preferential redemp-
tion to reduce accumulated taxable income, it would be inconsistent
to permit this type of redemption to accomplish the same result
indirectly by making the tax inapplicable. The court then outlined
two unreasonable results that the taxpayer's position would have
allowed. First, the difference between one cent of current earnings
and zero current earnings could have resulted in a difference of
thousands of dollars of tax liability. Secondly, if a corporation had
accumulated earnings to finance a redemption reasonably needed
by its business and used the funds for that purpose in the same year,
the transaction would not have affected liability in a future year;
but by merely postponing the redemption until the next year, the
corporation could have precluded liability in that year also if the
amount expended in redemption exceeded the later year's earnings.
Declaring that Congress could not have contemplated these results,
the court upheld the assessment and expressly refused to follow the
Tax Court's holding in American Metal Products.
1H. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court foreshadowed its holding by pointing out that
Congress intended that the accumulated earnings tax compel com-
panies with unneeded profits to make distributions upon which
their shareholders would incur taxation.3 After setting forth the
position of the Tax Court by quoting extensively from its opinion,3
which relied on Farish, .Corporate Investment Co., and American
Metal Products, the instant court refrained from further mention of
these cases. Next the court distinguished "earnings and profits"
from "taxable income", characterizing "earnings and profits" as a
31. That this decline was the sole basis for the decision as to 1953 seems clear from the
imposition of the penalty on the same corporation in both 1952 and 1954. Id.
32. 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5369 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
33. The court quoted from United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303 (1969)
(quoting Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943)).
34. GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 480, 489-92 (1973).
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broader concept not rigidly defined in the Code, but designed to
reflect a corporation's capacity to pass along tax consequences to its
shareholders through distributions to them .3 Then, beginning a
thorough analysis of the legislative history of the accumulated earn-
ings tax, the court quoted the 1913 provision 3 and some associated
floor debate, 37 which included the opinion of one senator that the
wording would allow review of any corporation with an unreasonable
accumulation. The court found in the original scheme of taxing
shareholders as partners the implication that Congress had not in-
tended reference solely to current gains and profits, because pro rata
taxation could then have been avoided by preferential distributions,
and further noted that in 1928 when the House used the phrase "to
remain accumulated" in its bill, neither the House nor the Senate, 38
which reverted to the original words "to accumulate", acknowl-
edged a difference in the meaning of the two phrases. The court
determined that the equivalency of these phrases further suggested
that Congress was not referring only to current gains and profits.
Focusing on the pro rata taxation effect of the early shareholder
election provisions, the court next construed these provisions to
indicate congressional disapproval of disproportionate distributions
as a means of evading the tax and to establish a statutory scheme
exempting a corporation only when its entire adjusted net income
was included pro rata in the shareholders' gross income. Concluding
that Congress never intended to require an accumulation of earnings
and profits in the taxable year as a condition precedent to imposi-
tion of the tax, the court proceeded to consider the present version
of the statute.
Observing first the denial of the dividends-paid deduction for
amounts preferentially distributed or reported,3 the court found
further evidence of the congressional policy to encourage pro rata
distributions to reduce or avoid the tax. The court stated that it
would be inconsistent and contrary to this policy to hold that a
disproportionate redemption that did not reduce the measure of the
tax could nevertheless allow a corporation to escape the tax entirely.
Returning to its discussion of accumulation, the court noted that
the present section 532 does not expressly require an accumulation
35. The court quoted a passage describing earnings and profits as "lean[ing] at one
time toward the accounting standard and again toward the taxable income standard." 1 J.
MErRE S, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXAIoN § 9.28 (rev. 1974). See note 19 supra and
accompanying text.
36. Tariff Act of 1913, § ]1(A)(2), 38 Stat. 166.
37. 50 CONG. REc. 5319 (1913) (remarks of Senators Borah and Williams).
38. See reports cited note 16 supra.
39. INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 562(c).
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of current earnings or any particular amount of accumulation, and
reasoned that if Congress had meant accumulation in the taxable
year, it would have specifically so provided as it had elsewhere." In
addition, the court observed that in the case of a corporation formed
for the proscribed purpose, there is no need at all to reconsider its
accumulation annually. Thus, after citing the Senate Report that
declared past accumulations relevant to the propriety of current
accumulations for purposes of the accumulated earnings credit,4'
the court held that past accumulations are similarly relevant in
determining whether the corporation was availed of for the pro-
scribed purpose. In further support of its position, the court quoted
the sections of the Ostendorf-Morris opinion 2 describing the unrea-
sonable results to which requiring an increase in earnings in the
taxable year might lead. In conclusion, the court stated that, from
the determination of the Tax Court that taxpayer was availed of for
the proscribed purpose in 1967, and from the role of the redemption
of the donated stock in 1968 as a necessary feature of the method of
avoiding tax, it appeared that taxpayer was availed of for the pro-
scribed purpose in 1968. Nevertheless, having held only that the
decrease in accumulated earnings did not preclude imposition of the
accumulated earnings tax, the court remanded for determination of
the factual issues of whether an unreasonable accumulation had
occurred and whether the corporation had been availed for the pro-
scribed purpose.
IV. COMMENT
The instant court rejected arguments based mainly on the
vague wording of the statute and relied on two basic policies-(1)
to compel pro rata distributions of unneeded funds that will be
taxable to shareholders and (2) to avoid constructions that lead to
inconsistent results in similar fact situations. Also, the court seemed
to contemplate two theories of liability available to the Commis-
sioner-first, that the corporation was "availed of" by permitting
funds not used in the redemption to remain accumulated, and sec-
ondly, that the corporation was "availed of" through the redemp-
tion itself. The arguments based on the equivalency of the phrases
"to accumulate" and "to remain accumulated", the purpose of Con-
gress to reach any corporation with an undue accumulation, and the
relevance of past accumulations, plus the remand for determination
40. The court quoted part of the definition of the accumulated earnings credit. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 535(c)(1)(A) (portion quoted note 17 supra).
41. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
42. 26 Am. Red. Tax R.2d 70-5369, 5372-73 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
[Vol. 28
RECENT CASES
of whether an unreasonable accumulation actually occurred, relate
to the first theory. Other arguments used by the court relate more
to the second theory-the repeated idea that preferential distribu-
tion of unneeded funds is not a congressionally approved method of
abating the penalty tax with respect to those funds, the mention of
corporations formed for the proscribed purpose that may be liable
without regard to actual accumulation, and especially the conclud-
ing statement that the judgment concerning 1967 made liability in
1968 apparent. The second theory is novel because it presents a
method by which a corporation may be "availed of" that does not
depend on the existence of any accumulation, current or total, in the
taxable year, but can be supported in this case on the ground that
the plan involved accumulation in a prior year.
The policy considerations and theories of liability of the instant
decision have added significance in light of other recent decisions
that have increased the attractiveness of charitable bail-out
schemes by holding that absent a pregift agreement obligating a
corporation to redeem stock donated by a shareholder to a tax-
exempt institution, post-gift redemptions do not constitute con-
structive dividends to the shareholder.43 Because the ability to re-
deem suggests unneeded funds44 and because taxpayers may have
difficulty proving the absence of a purpose to avoid tax by this type
of transaction, the Commissioner may turn to the accumulated
earnings tax as a weapon against the charitable bail-out. The in-
stant decision certainly will assist the Commissioner and may ena-
ble him to prevail in two related situations seemingly more favora-
ble to taxpayers-first, when the taxpayer carries out the entire plan
of donation, acquisition of funds, and redemption in a single year;45
and secondly, when the taxpayer reduces both current and total
accumulated earnings to zero by the redemption. In the first situa-
tion, the taxpayer might distinguish the instant decision on the
ground that it depended on either an unreasonable accumulation
remaining after the redemption or on accumulation in a prior year
as part of the plan. Nevertheless, the policy considerations of the
instant decision could still support the assessment. The Commis-
sioner could argue that, as in the instant case, the taxpayer defied
congressional will by distributing unneeded funds preferentially to
avoid tax, and that to hold the tax inapplicable would be inconsist-
43. Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973); Daniel D. Palmer, 62 T.C. 75
(1974); see 27 VAND. L. Rav. 603 (1974).
44. See Herwitz, supra note 20, at 866.
45. For a further discussion of accumulation during the year of the redemption see
Herwitz, supra note 20, at 932-37.
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ent with the instant case in which the tax applied in two years under
facts substantially identical except for the timing of the redemp-
tion. In the second situation, the taxpayer could assert the Farish
rationale and argue that since it had no earnings from which divi-
dends could be paid, it could not have been "availed of" within the
meaning of the statute. Farish could be distinguished, however, on
the ground that the absence of distributable earnings in that case
resulted from prior operating losses, not from a transaction that was
itself a necessary feature of the tax avoidance plan. The Commis-
sioner could again apply the policies of the instant decision by argu-
ing first that unneeded funds were distributed preferentially and
secondly, that to absolve the taxpayer merely because it had no
accumulated earnings left over would be inconsistent because a sin-
gle cent of residual accumulations would allow taxation of tax-
payer's entire accumulated taxable income. In either situation, the
Commissioner might also adduce the point made in the instant
decision that the concept of "earnings and profits" is not rigidly
defined in the Code, but is designed to reflect a corporation's capac-
ity to pass along tax consequences to its shareholders through distri-
butions to them. Because the taxpayers described had this capacity
prior to the redemptions, the Commissioner could simply argue that
they should be estopped from asserting any incapacity that they
voluntarily brought upon themselves. Thus, it seems possible for a
court to derive from the instant decision the proposition that when,
but for a redemption pursuant to a tax avoidance plan, a corpora-
tion would have had distributable earnings and profits, the accumu-
lated earnings tax may be applied.
In summary, until courts see fit to uphold constructive divi-
dend treatment of charitable bail-outs, a seemingly more direct
approach, the instant decision may make the accumulated earnings
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